A

MISCELLANY

OF DIVERS

Problems.

Containing ingenuous Solutions of sundry Questions, partly Moral, partly of other subjects.

Translated out of *French* by *H. S.* M. A.

LONDON,
Printed for *J. Phillips* and *H. Rodes*, in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1680.

To the vertuous Ladies, Mris Elizabeth Chaſe, *Mris* Frances Heywood, *and Mris* Lætitia Briggs, *the three ſiſters of his dear friend Mr.* H. Some.

Vertuous Ladies,

WHereas *common and low ſpirits*, might ſuſpect this action, as a

A 2 deſe-

deſign to renew a paſt ſorrow, ſeeing me, after a year of mourning, recall the memory of ſo ſad a loſs: I know, *your more generous ſouls*, will rather interpret my intent, an endeavour to allay your too long grief, when I revive the memory of a *dear dead Brother*: Since your reaſon, being ſo near of kind to his, cannot but judge it a weakneſs, to preferr the *paſſion* of an *uſeleſs ſorrow*, above the *merit* of a *pious gratitude*.

And

And yet considering, that others will be so partial, as to blame, whatever their fancies do not approve: I must forbear to heighten the cause of sadness, by recounting the particulars of your loss; only I would fain begg your leaves, to acquaint the world, that in *this* they and you are partners. But how shall I effect that? since experience hath now taught the vulgar, what was formerly reserved to the knowledge

of the more prudent; That the commendation of our friend is frequently but the cloak of a ſelf-conceited folly: And the world having been of late ſo much abuſed by hypocriſie, is now become ſuſpicious even of vertue, if once recommended; eſpecially by a perſon, whoſe obſcurity leaves him lyable to their cenſure. However the love of goodneſs, the obligation of friendſhip, and conſciouſneſs of truth, ſhall

ſhall prevail with me to the hazard of repute

I ſhould indeed, both betray an high folly in my ſelf, and injure the worth of my Friend, ſhould I, conſidering my own diſability, undertake to diſcourſe at large of all his merits; and yet thus much I cannot but ſay, his ingenuous diſcourſe, his modeſt deportment, his humility and candour, gained a more then or-

dinary reſpect from all that ever he converſed with, and this they ſhall witneſs for me: They that had the happy opportunity of knowing him more throughly, found his Learning ſo great, and communicated with that freeneſs; his piety ſo true, and practiſed with that innocence, that they could not but love him with admiration, which alſo increaſed in thoſe that had a more ſpecial and

conſtant intimacy with him; for ſuch knew him ſo paſsionate a Lover of all ingenuous Learning, that he ever counted that hour loſt, which was not imployed in ſome kind or other of it. He hated naught ſo much as idleneſs, or doing nothing, and that made his very recreations, as ſerious as others ſtudies. And this gave him the advantage of being skilled in modern languages: which although he attained unto, by

by a sagacity proper to his disposition, and his own industry, yet his courtesie would afterwards entertain discourse with the common Tutors and professed Teachers of them upon all emergent occasions. This his true love to Learning, gave our Nation the opportunity of knowing the Nature and Constitution of the new Famous French Academy, by his translation of their History, written by *Monsieur P. Pellisson*; which

was

was a thing so acceptable to the Author, that he was pleased to write him a particular acknowledgement, and communicate to him also this present *Treatise*, which likewise at times of divertisement he taught to speak English: In the perusal of which, I doubt not but the more ingenuous will reap satisfaction, and find sufficient cause to love the *Translators* memory, if they consider that it is not offered as a part of his

more

more ſolid labours, but as a valuable Eſſay of wit, and to be uſed as it was made, only in a Diverſion.

That which I offer to you, *worthy Ladies*, I give not as *a Preſent*, but repay *as a due*, which without injuſtice I cannot detain; a greater reaſon, then that which engageth me to a publication, entituling you to the right of Patronage: For the memory of a dear friendſhip cannot herein challenge

challenge any thing from me, but what the intereſt of a nearer relation makes entirely yours, and together with it, the Devoirs of

Your moſt humble

Cambridge,
Jan. 10.
1661.

ſervant,

Samuel Thoms.

TO THE READER.

Reader,

I Conceive it would be rather presumption in me than humility, if before you come to read what I here present you, I should not give an account of some things that respect

ſpect my deſign, and the manner of theſe *Problems*, which may occaſion you either to bear with their faults, or to condemn them with the more reaſon and juſtice. In the firſt place, ſeeing me alledge commonly many ſeveral reaſons of the Queſtions I handle, you may poſſibly deſire to know, Whether I propound part of them to exerciſe my wit, and to beautifie my work, like an Oratour, that ſaies not only all he believes to be true, or like truth, but alſo all that he thinks advantagious to his cauſe. To this, Reader, let me tell you, that in ſome places indeed, the obſcurity of my matter hath given me licence to make bold conjectures, and ſuch as ſeem-

ed

ed to me more likely to add Beauty than Light to my work. But that these places are very rare, and that everywhere else I have laboured to give only solid reasons, and have alledged many of them, because having considered my matter many wayes, and at several distances, I thought they might be all true. Some indeed may here say, that it is not very likely that one and the same effect should have such different causes, for commonly when we think we have found one solid cause of an effect, this makes us despise all others, and we are apt for this reason to esteem them vain and frivilous. But, Reader, I am not of this judgement, nay on the contra-

ry do think, that when we discourse upon an effect, we should scarce ever content our selves with *one* good and true cause of it alone, because every considerable effect hath *many* causes which contribute to its grandeur, as all Rivers are formed by the uniting of several brooks, and many petty rivulets. This is very evident of its self in some kind of things; as for example, That which casts a man into a disease, cannot be alwayes one sole cause, but many causes united; so when the Question is to discourse of the ruine of a State, it is clear, that it will never be sufficient to think of finding one solid reason only, because it alwayes hath many. But though

though I see my self confined within the bounds of a Preface, which I am afraid to exceed too much: yet I will in some sort shew you, as much as the brevity which I study will suffer me, that this is no less true in regard of our *Passions, Actions and Humours*, which are the matters the greatest part of this book is composed of. First, for our Actions, and the particular and ordinary motions of our mind, I may say that all our Passions do there appear together alwayes, and act their parts there, though it be not alwayes after the same fashion: just as in each Comedy that is acted, they are the same Actors that appear upon the Stage, though they do not

there repreſent the ſame perſons. And as they ſay that no Element ever appears to us in its purity, that is entirely ſeparated from others, and void of all mixtures; I conceive alſo that after the very ſame manner, not one of our ordinary Paſſions, which are as it were the Principles and Elements of our manners, doth ever appear in its purity, and without ſome mixture of the others: ſo that by this means it ſcarce ever happens, that it is only one ſpring which moves and actuates our ſpirits. It would be as long as it is eaſie to prove this by abundance of examples; but I ſhall content my ſelf to alledge ſome of them. If it be demanded,

Why

Why we desire glory? It is, without question, (to give one solid reason of it) because we look upon it as a second Life, and that we think our Being is amplified and extended according as our renown spreads very far, and as we are known to many men; but for all this, if there be not another cause given, we shall not very well satisfie this demand: For it is very evident, that we desire it also, because the good opinion that others have of our excellency, fortifies and upholds the opinion which we have of it our selves. Besides, we do without doubt desire to gain Esteem, because it is a way to make us be beloved, and that

we

we desire to be beloved; nay farther we wish it, both for its own sake (because there is a natural sweetness in being beloved, and that none of the least) and for the conveniences that come by it. Even so too, if a man enquires, *Why we revenge our selves?* he will presently find that we do it for divers several causes, which come from different respects. For it is partly because pretending that the injury received hath cast us down, we labour to raise our selves up again, by making him repent that did it. And partly, we do not desire only to make him repent, but we think also that we discharge our selves in some sort of the hurt we re-

ceive

ceived from him, in making him ſuffer as much. As we ſee that children think to free themſelves of a kiſs which one hath given them by force, in re-kiſſing him from whom they have received it, and ſay they will give it back to be rid of it themſelves. Partly alſo, (without having any regard to the thing in its ſelf) we revenge our ſelves for the opinion of others, and for fear one ſhould come to think that we had not power or credit enough to do it: Beſides this, we do it out of Fear for the future, and to the end that he which hath offended us, may not preſume to do ſo any more; (For though this be not formally the deſire of Revenge, certain it is that

it alwayes contributes thereunto :) And lastly, we revenge our selves, because that as the shaking of Fear ceases not so soon as the danger is over; so the hurt we received, hath left in us a blind impression of hatred which lasts still after that is past, and hath only its self for the reason of its self. If we should now examine the motion of the soul in *Love*, we should find in it a stranger mixture of all sorts of Causes, Natural and Moral, Corporal and Spiritual. In a word, we should as easily find that it is the same with all the other ordinary and extraordinary humours of our minds; I mean, that there is not any of them that hath one

only ſource, and that they have alwayes many roots, ſome whereof look backward, and ſome forward, ſome to the right hand, others to the left; nay we ſhould find they have almoſt alwayes quite contrary cauſes, ſince that moſt commonly they come to us partly from ſtrength and partly from weakneſs, partly from reaſon and partly from blindneſs; and that they almoſt alwayes ſhew both ſome perfection and ſome imperfection both at once.

Behold, Reader, the firſt thing I was to ſpeak to you of, upon which I have, it may be, inſiſted too long. Paſs we now to that which remains with all poſſible brevity. Some of my friends, whoſe leaſt advice

weighs much with me, counselled me not to forget in several places of this Book, some reasons that are commonly given upon the Questions I here handle, for fear least I seem to be ignorant of them. But I told them that this might breed in you a great dislike; and that besides, though those causes which are vulgarly given of divers Questions, are many times very good, yet are they more often superficial, or at least not the principal; and this in my opinion proceeds from hence, that the vulgar hath the common sense much better than its understanding; and that by this means it sees indeed well enough with a single eye the things that touch the

common

common ſenſe, but is much leſs able to give the reaſons of them, or diſcovers ordinarily only the ſhalloweſt. This I told them for mine own juſtification; and after they had heard me, they believed it was ſufficient that I alledge theſe vulgar reaſons; when it is altogether neceſſary to do ſo, and that I ſhould here acquaint you, that I have ſlighted many others, or for fear of rendring my ſelf tedious, I would not alledge them all.

Moreover, I have formed the moſt part of theſe *Problems* in a very conciſe and ſuccinct manner, and by way of Queſtion, in imitation of ſeveral antient Philoſophers, and that I might comprehend

the more things in fewer words. But because a concise and succinct reason, which strikes the mind suddainly, seems at first to be more acute and gentle, than solid and profound; and because I know that people judge often enough of things, as of men, by their countenance and habit: I was not willing to tie my self alwayes to this method, and have many times vented my reasons after a more Dogmatical and positive manner, and made my discourse a little more diffuse. Nevertheless, I hope that in judging the whole work in gross, you will acknowledge to me that I could not have allowed less room to these meditations which I here offer you, and that I had not a

design

design to make you lose in the reading of my book any considerable part of your time, which you ought to imploy better otherwise.

These are the three things, Reader, which I desired to speak to you of; However I do not pretend, by telling you what I have endeavoured to do, to prejudice you in favour of me; I say only that I have endeavoured, and not that I have performed any thing: and on the contrary, to take from you all preoccupation, and to leave your judgement the more free, let me tell you, in putting a period to this discourse, that I my self am not satisfied, whether I have conceived my reasons with sufficient strength, whether I

have explained them with grace and clearneſs enough; whether my ſtile be hard or pleaſant; and that I demand your judgement: Nay I declare unto you, that I doubt not but there are many faults in this my book; and that thoſe that ſhall think ſo, will be of my opinion. And if ſtill others ſay, that there are more faults than perfections in it, and that I have done nothing which deſerves that you ſhould read and approve it: I ſhall not reply any thing more harſh and ſharp, then that this may very eaſily be, ſince that my ſpirit is ſo imperfect, and that I am not certain they are in the wrong.

And if you demand, what it is that hath given me the confidence to expoſe to your view this

this work which I preſent, notwithſtanding the diffidence I have of my own abilities; I ſhall anſwer, that it is on the one ſide a certain Goodneſs and Complacency which ſome perſons Illuſtrious for their worth, and ſuch as I am ſure you know and reverence, have had for it; and on the other ſide, the extream deſire which I had to do ſomewhat that might be profitable to you; for it is certainly, Reader, this deſire, more than love of glory, or any hope that I could have conceived to ſee any ſucceſs proceed from my labours that might be advantagious to me, that hath ſweetened whatſoever it could have of pains or trouble in it; and I hope, that if you make

any reckoning of these Philosophical reflections, wherein I have mingled light matters with important, I may perhaps one day offer you some others upon higher subjects, from whence you may receive much more profit.

On

On the judicious Tranſlator Maſter *Henry Some* late of Ks. Colledge Fellow, my dear and deceaſed Friend.

WHat *Problems* Ariſtotle *never told*,
Nor Plutarch, *nor this* Oedipus *unfold*,

Reſolve

Resolve who can: wherefore im-
partial Fate
Of usefull mens short life contracts
the date?

Whence your small Pox more unre-
lenting are
Towards the High, the Learned
and the Fair?

Why fell such loyal expectations
short
Of your so near, and so long wish'd
for Port?

Why should a candid, studious,
peacefull mind
Scarce through this angry Age
safe passage finde?

But stay, bold Muse; None may
without offence

Fathom

Fathom the Depths of State and
Providence.
Rest we content what Nature hath
revealed
To read, and leave those other
volumes sealed.

Our Joy, our Sorrow with
(a) *distinguish'd tears;* (a) Pro
Our (b) *Laughter at this* (b)
Authors Bar appears;
Who doth to solid Reason recon-
cile
Ev'ry (c) *almost involun-* (c)
tary smile.
The spring of Passion, and
quick Debate
Of Actions seeming indeli-
rate,
Are here disclos'd: his Clue a
guide your mind
Her self through her own La-
rinths to wind.

(d) 51. *Now we discern,* (d) *Why*
the parch'd ears grow white,
When your hot Constellations
unite:

We more then feel what
(e) 7. (e) *streightned East-*
winds blow:
(f) 39. (f) *The Serick Insect we*
admire and know:

(g) 12. *I know too* (g) *Whence my*
friend who did but aim
At doing well, hath hit the mark
of Fame.

Yet unresolv'd of what one Page
pretends,
(h) 6. (h) *That men not best may*
make your surest friends,
His life retracts that; and against
pretence

Of

Of Demonstration brings full evidence.
Like dispositions strong affections move:
None worse then He, can challenge equal love.

Jan. 2. 1661.

Christopher Ware

Master of the Free-School of *Tunbridge.*

To

To my Worthy Friend Mr. Samuel Thoms *Publisher of this work of our Deceased Friend the Translator Mr.* Henry Some.

SOme do asperse *Translations*, say they be
Like *reverst Arras* rugged Imag'rie.
If so, wee'r well by this example taught
'Tis the *Translators*, not *Translations* faule.

SOME

SOME could out-do his author, lend his ſtory
A *borrow'd*, greater then its *native* glory;
Not like thoſe Scriblers, as ill taught as fed,
Who turn books not int' other tongues, but bread.
He knew as well to *write*, as to *Tranſlate*;
To *lend*, as *borrow* learning; nor ingrate
To forraign witts, could, as well ſtockt as they,
His *Paris* bills in *Cambridge* coyn repay.
Nay he was an *Original* of *wit*
So fair, ſo worthy, *Heaven Tranſlated* it.

But can name our loſs, nor pay his Herſe
The tributary duty of a Verſe?

A duty

A duty, though ſuperfluous, ſince he
Was to himſelf ſufficient Elogie.
Should we his *Learning*, *Vertue*, *Candor* ſcan,
Thoſe joynt *Perfections* ſpeak him more then *Man*.
Dear Sir! when I recall thoſe Attick nights
We once enjoy'd with him, thoſe loſt delights;
When his diſcourſe charmd our attentive ears,
And ſwell'd us then with joy, as now with *tears*,
When we could call his learn'd diverſions ours,
With which he us'd to wing the flow-pac'd hours;
Methinks ſtern grief doth all my ſence engroſs,
And the remembrance dupl[illegible]ates our loſs.

But

But Sir 'tis you alone muſt now re-
trive
This loſs, and in his writings make
him live.
Then as (while he lyes low in ſilent
earth)
You've given this *Poſthume off-ſpring*
happy birth;
So ſtill, *Lucina* like, propitious
be,
And 's *other labours* from abortion
free.
Raiſe him a *monument* laſting as
Fame,
And let as *Trophies* of his living
Name,
His *learned reliques*, while his aſhes
burn,
Riſe like the *Phœnix* from their *Pa-
rents* Urne.

Then when his happy labours ſhall
be grown
Old in eſteem, enrich us with your
own.

So ſhall your name with his enrolled ſtand,
And both in Honours train. walk hand in hand.

R. S. *Late Fellow of Kings Colledge.*

Upon

Upon the untimely death of his most Ingenious and Learned Friend Mr. *Henry Some*, the Translator of this Book.

SUrely in Nature, there's some reason, Why
The best of Spirits do the sooneſt Dy.
Brisk wits, it seems, are like the pureſt fire,
Which brightest burns, but sooneſt does expire.
The overleaven'd sort of men, we see
Aged and loathed like the Raven bee:
Whilst the more sprightly part, like fragrant Rose
Lov'd and long-liv'd in death their eyelids close:
The Learned Planet courtier to the Sun, (run
As swift as Post his stated race dot

Whilſt his dull brother, with his leaden
face,
Ends not his courſe, in twice ten times
the ſpace:
Ah me! it grieves me, that the ripeſt
wit,
Should fatal prove, to him that own
eth it:
This kild my Friend: from hencefort
be't a ſhame
To be long-liv'd, for years your wi
will blame.

J. Jones fellow of th
Kings Colledge in
Cambridge.

A Table of the Chapters contained in this Volume.

PROB. 1.

What is the reaſon that the addreſs and ſubtilty of wit which appears in the execution of an evil action, makes us think it ſometimes more ugly, and ſometimes leſs? pag. 1

PROB. 2.

Whence comes the cuſtom of making fire-works and ſhooting off Guns; either when a Peace is made, or after a Victory, or at the entrance of Princes into ſome City or upon

other the like occasions? 4

PROB. 3.

Whence is it that the Choler of him that hath no cause to be afraid of us, and hath our necks under his foot, is sometimes sooner appeased by bravadoes and boldness, then by humility and entreaties? 9

PROB. 4.

Whence comes it that Fears are a comfort to sadness, and how they are formed? 13

PROB. 5.

What is the reason there are Tears of joy? 16

PROB. 6.

Whence comes it that many very wicked men are often times the best friends? 20

The Table.

PROB. 7.

What is the reason that the Wind which comes in at a window, or a little hole, is more dangerous than that which we feel abroad in the open field? 25

PROB. 8.

Whence comes it that Evil is more active then good? 28

PROB. 9.

What is the reason that Water-drinkers are greater lovers of fruit than others? 31

PROB. 10.

What is the reason that there is no such enmity as that which succeeds amity? 33

PROB. 11.

Why hath extream affliction no Tears 3

PROB. 12.

What is the reason that some things are gotten best by neglecting them 4

PROB. 13.

What is the reason that those things which we are accustomed to, are not prejudicial to our health? 4

PROB. 14.

Whence comes it, that (as it is the saying of some body) a great service is not so proper to gain our affection as many petty services done in a continued series, and on all occasions

PROB. 15.

What is the reason that a great joy makes us facile to pardon injuries? 53

PROB. 16.

What is the reason there is so much false news spread abroad, and that many delight to make others believe strange things? 60

PROB. 17.

What is the reason that having been long on horse-back, a man doth better refresh himself by walking a little on foot, then by sitting still? 63

PROB. 18.

What is the reason that when we come to rest our selves after much walking, we find our selves more weary a while after? 64

PROB. 19.

Why is it good not to let a wicked man, that hath power to do what mischief he please, perceive that we are jealous of him? 66

PROB. 20.

Whence comes it that Beasts do know naturally how to swim, and that Man hath need to learn? 74

PROB. 21.

What is the reason that the fruits that grow at the tops of the boughs, are the best? 79

PROB. 22.

Why do good men think they ought to speak in proper terms of other Passions and Vices, but not of things

that regard Wantonneſs and Corporal love? 81

PROB. 23.

Whence comes it that they ſay whatſoever cures us and is good for us, diſlikes us, and that on the contrary, we love that which hurts us? 90

PROB. 24.

What is the reaſon that children in winter, though their face and hands ſeem to ſhew that they are more afflicted with cold then men grown, yet are not eaſily perſwaded to warm themſelves? 95

PROB. 25.

Whence comes it that when we are in affliction we are better diverted by the repreſentation of ſome Tragick Hiſtory, or by the recital of ſome great misfortune, then by more mer-

ry shews or facetious tales. 97

PROB. 26.

Why do some noises make a man sleep? 100

PROB. 27.

What is the reason we aggravate our miseries, and love to perswade others that we are very unfortunate? 105

PROB. 28.

Why do many men laugh to see another man fall? 113

PROB. 29.

What is the reason that they which embrace civil and worldly affairs with too violent an ardor, are subject to lose all sense of Religion and the knowledge of a Deitie? 115

PROB.

PROB. 30.

What is the reaſon that the loweſt Spirits are commonly moſt perſwaded of the truth of their opinions? 120

PROB. 31.

Whence is it that in the greateſt ſubjects of affliction, we do many times take up more readily a conſtant reſolution, then in others that are much lighter? 122

PROB. 32.

Wherefore are old men great talkers? 123

PROB. 33.

Whence comes it that in all kind of things thoſe that do but meanly in them, are moſt commonly more ſevere and rigid Judges of others, then thoſe that excell therein, and hold the firſt rank? 127

PROB. 34.

Whence comes it that it is ſo eaſie to blame and finde fault, that the leaſt able do it beſt, and that it is much more hard to commend? 132

PROB. 35.

What is the reaſon that when the Winter hath been very cold, they commonly ſay, the Summer that follows will be very hot? 136

PROB. 36.

What is the reaſon that Fear makes ones hair ſtand on end? 138

PROB. 37.

Whence comes it that many being in a Frenzy have ſpoken Latin, or Greek, without having ever learned either of theſe Languages? 141

PROB. 38.

What is the reaſon that a too earneſt entreaty makes us unwilling, inſtead of inciting us, to grant that which is deſired of us. 146

PROB. 39.

What are the cauſes of the marvellous things which we obſerve in the Silk-worm? 151

PROB. 40.

Why are good men oftentimes ſubject to a light promptitude of Choler? 161

PROB. 41.

Whence comes it that they ſay, the love of Grandfathers to their Grand-children is greater then that of their Fathers? 165

PROB. 42.

Why is it that a rare and eminent vertue which ſhines in a Prince, raiſes greater motions of love in the lower ſort of people then in other men? 168

PROB. 43.

What is the reaſon that Shame makes a redneſs ariſe in the face? 177

PROB. 44.

What is the reaſon that when we bluſh, it appears eſpecially in the forehead? 185

PROB. 45.

What is the reaſon that Praiſes make a man bluſh? 187

PROB. 46.

What is the reaſon a man laughs more

at a pleasant jest, or a merry tale, when he himself that tells it doth not laugh? 190

PROB. 47.

Why do we laugh in seeing a thing very ill-favoured, since that which delights the mind, one would think, ought to have in it some perfection? 193

PROB. 48.

What is the reason that Man being inclined to flatter himself, doth nevertheless aggravate his own imperfection above the truth; as for example, in saying there is nothing but folly, and injustice, and ingratitude in the world? 198

PROB. 49.

What is the reason that according to the common saying of the Poets and of Aristotle himself in the second

book of his Politicks, Valiant and courragious persons are most subject to love? 208

PROB. 50.

Whence comes that aversion to marriage of persons too near? 212

PROB. 51.

Whence proceed the excessive Heats of the moneth of Auguſt, *and the other effects which are attributed to the Dog-star?* 221

The End.

PROB. I.

What's the reaſon that the addreſs and ſubtilty of wit, which appears in the execution of an evil action, makes us think it ſometimes more ugly, and ſometimes leſs?

THis Queſtion having two parts, doth not the reaſon of the firſt conſiſt in this, that he which is ingenious and imployes his wit to do ill, ſeems to be more ungratefull towards God, in abuſing the gifts which he hath received of him? Or elſe is it, that he which

hath cunningly carried on a ver
malitious action, ſeems not to hav
been touched with any remorſe o
conſcience that troubled his judg
ment, for which reaſon he is accoun
ed more wicked and more unnatura
Or elſe, is it that an evil action fu
of wit and addreſs, cannot have be
committed by a ſudden and pardo
able motion; and that this addre
which appears in it, ſhews that
man hath digeſted it at his leaſur
that he had a long time had it in h
mind, and that he executed it wi
a full and conſtant will? Or elſe,
it becauſe he that ſins ſo craftil
ſeems to have been very violen
deſirous to ſin, ſince it is certain th
a violent deſire whets the wit, a
renders it fruitful in invention
Or elſe, is it becauſe the more i
genious a treaſon is, the more cl
and ſecret alſo it is; ſo that there
requiſite the more impudence a
diſſimulation to execute it?
laſtly, is it becauſe the rendr

deceitful by a very refined treaſon, the common aſſurances which we take of things, is an undermining the foundations of publick repoſe, and after a particular manner, the ſhaking of nature, which hath not given us any better means to guide our ſelves in civil ſociety, and an inſtructing of knaves new wayes to hurt honeſt men, ſo that this is a being doubly guilty; as a thief is doubly guilty, if not content to ſteal the fruits of a garden, he enters into it by ſome place formerly inacceſſible, and makes a new way for thoſe that ſhall have a mind to imitate him? But if this be ſo, whence comes it then, that at other times the ingenuity that ſhines in the execution of an ill action, makes us blame it leſs ſharply, and ſweetens the hatred it ought to beget in us? Is it in this caſe not ſo odious, becauſe the luſtre of wit may in ſome ſort repair the defect of it? Or elſe, becauſe when experience teacheth

us, that the *beauty* of the mind, and a *black* malice ſeldome lodge together, and do not willingly aſſociate; we do then frame ſome excuſeable motives to an evil action, when we ſee ſome gentleneſs ſhine in it, and conceive that he that did it, was forced to it, either out of *Gallantry*, or by the ſtrength of ſome ſudden *Paſſion*, rather than out of an extream *Malice* and *ill-nature*?

PROB. 2.

Whence comes the cuſtome of making fire works, and ſhooting off guns, either when a peace is made, or after a victory, or at the entrance of Princes into ſome City, or upon other the like occaſions?

FIrſt, as to publick rejoycings; Is it becauſe joy which is a violent dilatation of our ſpirits, cannot be better expreſſed, then by ſhews which

which consist only in violent dilatations of powder by fire? Or else, if there be no likelyhood that men did so nicely regard such a relation, and that mans imagination out of a secret impulse, took up a thing that resembles the motion of joy to express it by? Is it rather because *Light*, which all these Artificial fires redouble, is naturally the Emblem of *Joy*, and does naturally delight the imagination more than any thing? And therefore we call *sadness* a *dark* cloudy humor, and when we speak of it, we say that it overspreads the mind as 'twere with a *cloud*. Or else, is it not because we finding that our *own* voice is too weak to represent our joy, and that it is wholly unequal to the greatness of our contentment, we borrow the mouth of Cannons, and the noyses of powder to express it, and to carry the news of it speedily on every side, and make it as it were even mount up to heaven? It is manifest that *Joy* of all

the Paſſions is that which deſires moſt to be known and publiſhed, and a joyfull man is equally raviſhed that his friends and enemies know that he is ſo. Or elſe, as it is a pleaſure to ſee the picture of ſome great Dragon, which had frighted us, after that we have no more cauſe to fear it; is it not alſo delightful for the ſame reaſon to ſee the vain images of troubles, violences, and paſſed wars in the fires of joy after that a peace is begun? Or elſe may we take it thus, that as it is a ſign a man hath faſt bound a ſavage beaſt, when he can play with it without harm, and without dread, and make a paſs-time of its rage and fury; ſo it is a ſign that one hath faſt chained up that cruel monſter, War, when one can freely ſport with the moſt terrible inſtruments of its fury, when one can make them vomit up, whatever they have moſt hurtful and affrighting, without any mans receiving either fear or hurt thereby; and that one

makes them ſerve for a divertiſement to Women and Children? Or elſe is not this *ſecondary* and innocent uſe which we make of them as it were a teſtimony that we aboliſh the *firſt*; and therefore alſo when we would ſpeak of a profound peace, we uſe to ſay that all the inſtruments of War ſhall become inſtruments of Husbandry, or ſhall be employed to other uſes?

Now ſeeing that fireworks and the reports of the Canon are uſed to repreſent a publick joy, is it not for the ſame reaſon that they are uſed at the entrance of Princes into ſome City, as it were to teſtifie to them that their arrival is eſteemed a publick happineſs? Or elſe was it not firſt inſtituted on this manner, out of an extream *flattery*, as if they meant to ſay, that they judged the ſoul of the Prince that is thus received, ſo *Martial*, that they thought they could not better pleaſe him, than by ſhows that repreſent *War*?

If any one, notwithſtanding all this, ſhall wonder, that to *receive* a Prince, we do to him in like manner as we would do if we deſired to *drive* him *away*, and that we expreſs our *kindneſs* by the moſt proper marks of *hatred* and *hoſtility*: is it not on the contrary, partly for that the imagination of men is carried to it, becauſe naturally a violent *love* borrows the characters of *hate*? Therefore we ſee that beaſts when they make much of their little ones, they ſtrike them little blows, and toſs them up gently into the air; and that mothers careſſing their children with all tenderneſs, give them little *pats* and call them *rogues*: and that the beſt friends delight to quarrel with one another ſeemingly and in jeſt: and we might queſtionleſs prove the ſame by *wanton love*, choſe we not rather to paſs by this proof, then to write any thing that ſhould defile this paper. And if yet you demand of me, why a violent *love* borrows

borrows the characters of *hatred*; Is it not out of a too great desire of flying the appearances of flattery, and false amity, that it runs into this contrary extream, which is more irrational; as if flying from an enemy, a man should cast himself down a precipice? Or rather that in this there is nothing done otherwise than ought to be, but that extream *love* hath some characters like to the violence of *hatred*, because generally all extreams resemble one another?

PROB. 3.

Whence is it that the Choler of him that hath no cause to be afraid of us, and hath our necks under his feet, is sometimes soonr appeased by bravado's, and boldness, than by humility and entreaties?

IS it not for the reason that *Montague* gives of it; namely that

generous persons suffer themselves rather to be overcome by the generosity and greatness of the courage of him whom fortune hath laid low, than at his cryes and groans, because they are more ready to reverence the image of vertue, then simply to be bent by compassion, which many times may be unreasonable? Or else, is it from some other causes, as for instance this, that it is a thing that astonishes and surprizes him who can do what he please with us, to see that instead of submitting to him, we brave him, and that every astonishment is as it were an arrest and surprizal of the spirit, which consequently interrupts the motion of Choler, and gives the soul that is surprized with it, time to be better advised? To this might be added, perhaps, that in Choler the soul many times moves not, but by the violence of the first swing that is given it; and that in this case if one can stop it, it is infallibly extinct; as

one

one deads the motion of a body which is moved only by the violence of an impreſſion it receives, if one ſtop it but one ſole moment. Or elſe, is it becauſe the bravado's and boldneſs of thoſe whom an extream misfortune hath caſt down, doth not ſhew ſo much *Conſtancy* and *Reſolution*, although at the firſt ſight it ſeems to do ſo; as on the quite contrary *Deſpair*, becauſe he that *hopes* nothing, doth likewiſe *fear* nothing; ſo that inſtead of raiſing *Choler* it excites *Pitty*? Or elſe may we venture to ſay, that naturally every thing is extinguiſhed by the ſame cauſes which made it live, when they are too abundant; and that as *Love* is extinguiſhed by too free and too wanton careſſes, and *Fire* by too great an abundance of wood caſt on it, it may fall out ſome times after the very ſame manner, that the extremity and utmoſt exceſs of injuries *appeaſes* Choler inſtead of *provoking* it? Or elſe, is it not becauſe the reproaches

proaches, and bravado's of thoſe that ſee themſelves to be in our power, are a teſtimony of their *freeneſs*, and that we believe they have no worſe thoughts than thoſe that they dare thus expreſs with ſo much liberty, whereas, if they beg of us with ſubmiſſion and humility, we ſuſpect them of *hypocriſie*, and fear leaſt this diſſimulation covers ſome black revenge, and an implacable and furious hatred againſt us? Or elſe, is it that for a man to humble himſelf before us, is to furniſh us with a ſubject of only *Vulgar* clemency, which as it is leſs fair, ſo it doth with leſs violence attract us; and that, on the contrary, to brave us, after having offended us, is to furniſh us with matter for an *heroick* clemency, which is more beauteous in its ſelf, and followed with more of glory? Or laſtly, is it that he which doth freely reproach us, and boldly declares our injuſtice, cutting our ſoul to the very quick by this vio-

lence

ſence of his diſcourſe, doth awaken it, makes it come to its ſelf, forces it to be attentive to the reaſons he alledges, and makes it comprehend them better, after which, though its intereſt oblige it to a greater revenge then before, it cannot ſtill continue its rage, becauſe, as *Ariſtotle* ſaith very well, *a man is never angry injuſtly*, that is to ſay, againſt that which he doth very clearly know to be reaſonable?

B

Prob. 4.

Whence comes it that Tears are a comfort to ſadneſs, and how are they formed?

A

Is it not that Tears do not properly unload the *heart*, as it is commonly ſaid, but the *brain*, which being more dry after it is delivered of thoſe humidities, ſerves the ſoul better, and is the cauſe that he which

is

is afflicted having his reaſon more clear and ſtrong, ſees better the juſt grounds he hath to comfort himſelf? Certainly it is probable enough that the *brain* becomes more free, and the ſpirit more *ſerene* after this *ſtorme* of *tears*, as we ſee the *air* is never more ſerene than after *rain*; and the example of children teaches us that the moiſtneſs of the brain accompanies the weakneſs of reaſon. Or is it moreover that by weeping we diſcharge part of the pituitous humour, or of the melancholy humour, both which caſt the ſpirits into penſiveneſs, and a dull heavineſs or ſtupidity? Truely this ſecond reaſon ſeems not to be void of likelyhood no more than the firſt. But (will ſome one ſay) whence proceed Tears, and what is their fountain? Certainly it is no eaſie queſtion to anſwer; and perhaps, to reſolve it exactly, would require a longer ſearch then can be allowed a Problem. But yet methinks one might venture

venture to say according to the appearances we see, that our inward parts compressing themselves in sadness, as it is the property of compression, there issues from them some moisture by this compression, as from a sponge squeezed: Or else that the brain continuing cold in sadness by reason of the spirits flying to the heart, it yeilds through its coldness some thin substance which becoming heavy, seeks its way out; Or else, as sadness generally weakens whatever is in us, that retentive faculty of him that is sad, is not strong enough to keep back, as it did before, those humidities, which we call Tears, but suffers them to run out when it relaxeth its self.

PROB.

Prob. 5.

What is the reaſon there are Tears of joy?

Is it that a too violent *good* wounds us many times as well as too ſtrong a *light*? Or elſe that every change of condition in which one hath long continued, how happy and advantageous ſoever it be, hath alwayes ſomething of incommodious in it? Or elſe, that there is ſome bitterneſs, and as it were an infuſion of wormwood in the greateſt part of the ſweets of this life? Or elſe, is there not ſome natural reaſon in it? and may we not ſay that *joy* exceſſively dilating our inward parts, doth by this means drive out ſome humidity; becauſe that which is dilated cannot contain it ſelf in the ſame bounds where it was before? Or elſe, is it not that in an affliction,

affliction, we are hindred from weeping, out of a fear for the future, which makes us imploy all our thoughts in consideration of means that may deliver us from that which we fear; so that after we are become more happy, we do yet many times nevertheless cry, to satisfie that desire which we had to do so? Or else, is it not credible, that we never understood our misery better, then when being delivered from it, we can compare the image of it, which is still very fresh in our memory, with a quite contrary condition: so that it is not to be wondred at, if many times this comparison which discovers to us the greatness of it, makes us weep even in the midst of our joy, through a kind of pitty we have of our selves? Or else shall I take it thus, that in the sudden motions of a great joy, the dilatation of the spirits of the heart is so great, that it is weakned thereby, and that our

soul

ſoul finding its own weakneſs, by this means is apt to be wounded by every reflexion that hath never ſo little of trouble in it? Or laſtly, do not theſe tears of joy proceed from hence, that learning all on a ſudden, that we are delivered from ſome great evil, under which we have lain a long time, the news cannot preſently gain an entire belief in us: and that as a body that is frozen, doth not loſe its coldneſs at that very inſtant it is brought to the fire; by the ſame reaſon our ſoul cannot loſe that impreſſion of its paſſed ſadneſs, at the very ſame inſtant that the good it was deprived of becomes preſent to it? See then the cauſes which it ſeems may be given of that marvellous ſtate of man, wherein he weeps although he have a ſerene ſpirit, by an accident which we ſee ſometimes happen in the air when it *rains* and *ſhines* both at once. There are are alſo Tears which abundant *laughter* brings into

into our eyes; but they are not of the ſame *ſpecies* with thoſe I ſpake of but now; and I conceive, they proceed only from that great and violent agitation which laughter cauſes within us; for there is no paſſion which ſhakes a man all over with greater violence; and it may very well be, that a motion ſo violent forces out of the eyes ſome humidity; as we ſee that the violent agitation of a veſſel wherein there is ſome liquor, makes ſome drops of it ſparkle out; and as the wind that ſhakes the trees after a rain, makes thoſe drops which lay there, fall to the ground.

PROB.

Prob. 6.

Whence comes it that many very wicked men, are oftentimes the beſt friends?

IT is found by experience, that very bad men are often moſt zealous friends to them that they bear an affection to, nay ſometimes more then the beſt of men. To enquire then the cauſes of this effect, is it not that there is a kind of amity which is not begotten by *reaſon*, but by a means more low, namely long *acquaintance* and *familiarity*: ſo that ſouls of the loweſt rank and that have the leaſt of reaſon, are not incapable of it: but on the contrary are in ſome ſort more capable than others, becauſe not governing themſelves by judgement, they do only follow the impreſſions of other things; amongſt which, that which

length

length of time and *use* makes, is none of the least? Or else, is it not because good men are friends only *ad aras*, that is, as far as will stand with Religion, and wicked men beyond? So that if they must only prostitute their consciences to their friends, and tread underfoot all things sacred, and despoile themselves of the fairest ornaments the soul can be adorned with, they do it very willingly. Or else, is it not that as *dogs* are faithful to us, and succour us against those that set upon us, partly indeed out of *love*, but partly also because it is their *disposition* to be easily provoked: so wicked men help us with great ardour against our enemies, and combat them with great animosity, not only for the affection they bear us, but partly also, for that by reason of their *natural curstness* and *venome*, of which they are full, they are more apt to be inflamed with a violent choler? Or else, is it because it is very natural for us to

love

love with violence something without us; wicked men that love neither *God*, nor *Justice*, nor *common goodness*, are constrained by the force of nature to love infinitely some particular persons? Or else, is it that cultivating only that part of their duty which consists only in *friendship*, and keeping that only as a remainder of the beauty of the soul, which hinders them from altogether resembling savage beasts, they have the more love for that, as a mother hath the more love for her son, if he be her only one? Or lastly, is it not that the nature of things is such, that generally in every extream there is some light mixture of the contrary extream: For instance, we see by experience that in cold Countries there are sometimes in summer more violent heats then those of the hot Countries; and on the contrary, the subtilty of the air of the hot Countries is the reason that sometimes the cold there is more pene-

trating than that of the cold Countries. The *Germans* that pass for the least subtle people of *Europe*, have more of subtilty than any of the rest in all sort of *mechanick inventions*. The most ingenious people are commonly the most awkward and unapt in some slight things. *Melancholy* persons are subject to more violent joyes, then those that are *sanguine*; *covetous* people, according to the vulgar opinion, are sometimes carried out to a greater excess of prodigality then *prodigals*. Men extraordinary valiant do often tremble more then others at the sight of a great danger. *Women*, whose visage is more properly then that of men *the seat of Beauty*, are also more susceptible then men of an extream and horrid *uglinesse*. Lastly, to return to the mixture of goodness and wickedness, one of the cruellest Emperours of *Rome* could not, as the Historian saith, be present at

the acting of a *Tragedy*, but thoſe faigned miſeries which he there heard, raiſed a compaſſion in him which made him weep. We read as much of another Tyrant of *Greece* of the ſame nature; and when a man is arrived at the higheſt degree of wickedneſs, the laſt crime he commits, is to be his own murderer, and voluntarily to throw himſelf into everlaſting pains, by the violence of the remorſe of his conſcience. In which there ſeems to be a certain air and ſhaddow of magnanimity and heroick goodneſs.

PROB. 7.

What is the reason that the Wind which comes in at a window or a little hole, is more dangerous than that which we feel abroad in the open field?

UPon this Problem some may possibly think, that as the *water* meeting with a very narrow channel, becomes more rapid; so the *wind* that comes in at a door, or a window, or a small chink, for the same reason redoubles its violence: Which is very true, but nothing to the purpose, for the clearing the difficulty of this Question: because it is certain that a very little wind gliding in at a cranny, is more apt to hurt one, then another wind much more violent, when one is in the open field. This cause then being thus rejected, is it not rather because

the wind which we ſuffer in the open field doth preſently cloſe the pores through its coldneſs, and ſo arms us againſt it ſelf: whereas the wind that comes into the houſe by ſome little hole, finds us hot all the time, and conſequently doth, as long as it continues blowing, find our fleſh ſoft, and eaſily penetrable. Or elſe, is it becauſe the wind that cools only one part of us, ſuch as that is which comes in at a little crack, makes the ſpirits, to which this coldneſs is an enemy, fly to the other parts, which is hurtful to this? Or elſe, in plain terms, as the welfare of a Commonwealth conſiſts in a certain proportion of the *Citizens* one to another; ſo the good ſtate of the *body* is a certain equal temper of all the *parts*: ſo that when any thing breaks this equality and harmony, and cools one part, while the reſt continue warm, this is in it ſelf a malady, and it were better they had been all equally cooled? Or elſe, is it becauſe the wind

wind that one ſuffers in the open field, is a very *wide*, and as it were *broad* motion of the air, which arriving at us, muſt needs break it ſelf againſt our body, as it were a *wave*, and paſs on each ſide without penetrating it: Whereas the wind of a little hole, being *ſharp*, doth the better *penetrate* our pores, and doth us the more miſchief: as we ſee that an *arrow* which does not hurt us if it be caſt at us *broadwiſe*, wounds and pierces us if it hits us with the *point*? Or laſtly, doth not that which *Plutarch* ſaies, contribute to the ſame effect, *viz.* that the wind of a little hole, hurts us the more, becauſe we take no heed of it, and that ſo we ſuffer it a great while before we put our ſelves in a condition to avoid it?

PROB. 8.

What is the reaſon that Evil is more active than Good?

IT is a very ſtrange thing, and yet very true, that *Evil* is more active than *Good*. *Grief*, which is an evil, is more active than *pleaſure*, and ſurmounts it ſo much in violence, that although a man be at the ſame time tickled with all the pleaſures that can flatter the ſenſes, a ſmall *Grief* will be able to ſpoil all his happineſs. As Grief is ſtronger than Pleaſure; ſo Fear, which is a production of Evil, is a paſſion much more violent than *Hope*, which is a production of Good. *Bad examples* have more force to debaſe our minds, then *good* have to raiſe them up. *Poyſons* are ſtronger than *Remedies*; and whereas there is not any remedy that can cure us of our ma-

ladies

ladies, unleſs it be applyed to us, there are poyſons ſo violent that they kill us with the very ſmell of them, if they do but come nigh our noſtrils. Things that are the ſweeteſt to the taſte, as *Honey* and *Sugar*, are not yet ſo ſweet, as *Wormwood* is bitter: and if you mingle an equal quantity of them together, the reſult will be bitter and not ſweet, the ill ſavour prevailing over the good. Laſtly, to omit nothing upon this ſubject, and to run through all kind of things by which this truth may be cleared, although amongſt colours *White* be naturally more excellent than *Black*, as more approaching to the nature of Light: So it is, as Painters have obſerved, that it is the moſt feeble of all; and that, if one mixeth it in an equal quantity with *black*, it is alwayes vanquiſht. But what then is the cauſe of a thing that ſeems ſo contrary to reaſon? I anſwer, that there can be no other given of it, but this, that Good

here *below*, is not in its fountain, and that we see only some weak raies and small sparks of it; for if it were at *home* in its fountain, it would infallibly conquer Evil, and would be too strong for it, since that *Activity* being a *Good*, it is impossible but that it should be a property and dependance of *Good* rather then of *Evil*. But as of two Kings, he that is the strongest may be vanquished by the other, in a place where he hath not the body of his forces, and his greatest power: So it may very well be that *Good* may be more active than *Ill*, and yet that it may be vanquisht by it in *this* world where we are, and, as I may so say, in this *lower region* of things, where it is not in its fountain, and in its greatest glory, and from hence may be drawn a very strong consideration to demonstrate *the existence of God*, as I could shew more at large, and more clearly, if it were here my design.

PROB.

Prob. 9.

What is the reason that Water-drinkers are greater lovers of fruit then others?

IS it not becauſe *water* hath a certain faint quality that offends the ſtomach, and the juice of fruit corrects that quality, and is to them as a kind of *wine* which they are not averſe from? Or elſe, doth not the ſame reaſon that makes them love water, make them alſo love fruit, to wit, becauſe they love all things that are moiſt and cooling, and that fruit as well as water is in the number of things that are moſt ſo? Or elſe, is it not becauſe they which drink water only, do with more difficulty digeſt, and for this reaſon they love things that are eaſily digeſted, ſuch as are moſt fruits, and prefer them before viands that give more pain to

the natural heat? And if any demand, Whence it is that they ſay alſo, that on the contrary thoſe which are great lovers of wine, do not care at all for fruit: Is it not the contrary to thoſe reaſons I now mentioned? Or elſe, do they not hate fruit, becauſe by their moiſture, they dull and deaden the palate, and ſo render it leſs ſenſible of the pleaſure to which they are ſo much addicted? Or doth not the ſame reaſon for which they love ſalt and drying meats, make them alſo hate thoſe that quench the thirſt, amongſt which it ſeems fruit holds the firſt rank?

PROB. 10.

What is the reaſon there is no ſuch enmity as that which ſucceeds amity?

IS it not becauſe our mind doth ardently affect all *new* things, and loves *change*; and that when we come to hate him, whom we have a long time loved, it is a very great *novelty* and an extream *change*, which conſequently hath ſome particular allurement to attract our minds and engage it more violently in its deſign? Or elſe, do not great friendſhips leave behind them great enmities, becauſe they could not have been deſtroyed but by great quarrels, and great ſubjects of hatred and diſcontent? Or elſe, is it becauſe as a *ſtranger*, whom we do not know, cannot be either hated or loved: by the ſame reaſon, he that is

very well *known*, may be hated more, and loved more than another; and that there are none ſo well known to us, as thoſe whom a long friendſhip hath made us familiarly acquainted with. And indeed as the great knowledge we have of them makes us more lively imagine the motions of hatred they bear us, the *words* they will ſay, the *thoughts* they will have, and their very *geſtures* in their anger, it is credible that this ſerves to inflame our wrath. Or elſe perhaps we may ſay that thoſe, that are great lovers of one another, do only *ſeem* to hate more then other men; and perhaps they ſeem ſo, becauſe that ſome relicks of friendſhip, which they cannot chaſe out of their mind, rendring the injuries which they mutually do one another, more grievous, makes them complain thereof with words fuller of paſſion, and talk of it unceſſantly. Indeed it is queſtionleſs much more grievous to be wronged by him that one loves, then by

by him that one hates; becauſe this kind of wrong raiſes as it were a *Civil war* in our paſſions, exciting one part of our heart againſt the other, and hinders us not only from *obtaining* what we deſire, but alſo from *deſiring* it compleatly and without repugnance of a piece of our ſelves; and *Lovers* may be good teſtimonies of this truth; for it is certain, as there are many waters that do not offend the *ſound* parts of our bodies, but yet when they touch a *ſore* place, cauſe there incredible pain: So this ſweet wounding of their heart, makes them moſt ſenſible of injuries, which, without that, would not vex, nor move them at all. Or, laſtly, thoſe that loved very dearly, do combate one another with the cruelleſt acts of enmity, to learn, as I may ſo ſay, to hate one another, and to confirm themſelves in that bitterneſs and violence, into which they are faln, becauſe they find, that all ſorts of habits are

fortified

fortified by exercise, and by the acts which they produce.

Prob. II.

Why hath extream affliction no tears?

Doth it not proceed from hence, for that the soul in an extream affliction, hath no *lively* apprehensions, such as those must be that raise tears, but falls into a kind of *stupidity* and *insensibleness*? Or is it not because when we are extreamly afflicted, Nature, which finds that the greatness of our Affliction would make us shed too many tears, and that so great an evacuation might excessively weaken, instead of comforting us, keeps them back altogether, and resists the motion of our disordered minds, which, were it not for that, would abuse this soveraign remedy, and employ it to our own ruine? Or else, may we not upon

upon this subject say, that he that is mightily afflicted, cannot weep as he would do, because generally every excessive passion hinders it self from arriving at its end, and becomes an obstacle to its self; and that for this reason those that are oppressed with too much *Fear*, desiring to flie, find that it hath nailed their feet to the ground; and that their hand shakes that are too much in *Choler*, and that they cannot express but by inconsequent and disjoynted words, the greatness of their passion, no more then those whom a too great *Love* possesses, or those who are in a too great excess of *Joy*? Certainly it seems that this is not void of likelihood. And if it be asked, Why every excessive passion fails of arriving at its end? it may be answered, that this happens to it, because it is a malady of the soul, and a defect; and that the qualities proper to a malady are, impotence, weakness and ill success. Or else, every

in-

inordinate paſſion is an obſtacle to its ſelf, and is impotent, becauſe it deſires things *vaſt* and *infinite*, and beyond all *poſſibility*, which hinders our ſoul from executing thoſe that are *real* and *poſſible*. For we ſee evidently, that he which is moved with a very great *Choler*, cannot expreſs, at leaſt in common and ordinary words, his reſentment, and the indignity which raiſed it, becauſe he ſeeks the moſt ſtrong, and deſires to uſe a more eager expreſſion then the language of man is capable of. It is plain alſo, that *Lovers* do many times *hack* and *hammer* inſtead of *ſpeaking*, for the ſame reaſon, namely becauſe they would invent terms that ſhould be as it were all *flame*, and have more *force* and *energie* then they can have; and that a like deſire is the cauſe alſo why *Joy*, which is ſo *talkative*, becomes *mute* in being increaſed too much, or brings forth only ſighs and inarticulate and confuſed ſounds. And as for exceſſive

Fear,

Fear, though this be a passion to which one cannot so easily apply this reason; yet one may say possibly, that he which is too lively possest by the image of a terrible and present danger, hinders himself, that in this perturbation and trouble wherein he is, he desires not simply to run, but to use some means more prompt and efficacious then natural and ordinary ones by which a man runs away; and that his imagination thus overslipping whatsoever is real and possible, as that of others which we spake of but now, does not, by reason hereof, put in practice those faculties that move the parts of his body; for it is evident that it is the operation of the *Fancy* that must put in practice those faculties. But however it be, it is very likely that *Anger*, *Joy*, and *Love*, fail of expressing themselves well, for this reason; and if it be so, we may with likelihood say, that even so he which is very much afflicted, cannot weep,

because

becauſe that his ſoul diſdaining the common characters of ſadneſs, ſearches in that ardour wherein it is, ſo great ones that they are impoſſible. Or elſe, we may ſay that it doth not ſearch for ſuch, but as that antient Painter, that choſe rather to cover with a veil the face of *Agamemnon*, then venture to repreſent his grief: it alſo chuſeth rather to refrain tears, and words, and not to paint forth the greatneſs of its affliction, then to be forced to paint it by the ſame things which the ſmalleſt of afflictions make uſe of. If any one be not ſatisfied with all theſe reaſons, it may yet poſſibly be added, that, as we ſaid before, a moderate compreſſing of the inward parts, may ſqueeze forth the humidity of tears; and a too violent compreſſion of the ſame parts may, on the contrary, keep them in, by cloſing up the paſſages by which they uſe to come to the eyes.

Prob. 12.

What is the reason some things are gotten best by neglecting them?

WE said in the fore-going *Problem*, that a Passion being wrought to a very high pitch, is an obstacle to its self, and hinders us from arriving at what we aim at. Now we will endeavour to give a reason of a difficulty like to that, but yet greater, *viz.* Why there are many things which are best acquired by neglecting them, and looking another way. Thus for example, the Philosophers have observed to us, that *Glory* is of such a nature, that the best means to get it, is to run away from it, and not to desire it, and that she favours those most, that do least regard her. *Pleasure*, if we consider it well, is like to it in this: for the soul being softened through the

the love of pleaſure, and reſt, becomes ſo ſenſible of incommodities and griefs, ſo vulnerable by all ſorts of croſſes, and ſo feeble, that the leaſt thing wounds it mortally, and makes it deſpair; and even the ſmalleſt misfortunes become great unto it: On the contrary, the contempt of pleaſure gives it preſently a more ſtrong conſtitution, by which it ſuſtains the ſhock of evils that would diſturb her reſt and her pleaſures, and by taking away her delicacy, makes her not to ſtand in need of *extream* pleaſures to be delighted, but to be ſatisfied if ſhe have *common* ones. In *Eloquence* and *Converſation*, there are alſo many *Graces* which are not gotten if one *affects* to have them, and muſt, as I may ſo ſay, *eſcape* from us without our knowledge, to be *natural and charming*. But I need not enlarge here into any large diſcourſe, to prove this verity by many examples, ſeeing we meet with it at every turn in the things of

our life, and that even the vulgar confeſs it and alledge it very often, though they are ignorant of the cauſe of it. But it conſiſts in this, that *all thoſe things that are beſt gotten by neglecting them, are vanities*; for our ſoul weakens it ſelf by the deſire of vanities; but on the contrary ſhe fortifies her ſelf, and gets more light and ſolidity, when ſhe with-draws her affection from them, and by theſe new forces, which by this means ſhe acquires, ſhe obtains afterwards not only greater advantages, but alſo even thoſe ſlight ones which ſhe contemned; for theſe ſlight and vain good things are commonly appendixes to ſolid ones, and follow them as images and ſhadows follow bodies.

PROB.

PROB. 13.

What is the reaſon that thoſe things to which we are accuſtomed, are not prejudicial to our health?

THere is nothing more common then that ſaying, that things which we are accuſtomed to, are not prejudicial to our health; and there is commonly a reaſon given of it, with which men are ſatisfied, *viz. that Cuſtom is a ſecond Nature.* But certainly I conceive, that he which will a little caſt the eye of his mind upon this anſwer, and conſider it at his leiſure, will ſee it vaniſh. For *Cuſtom* hath indeed ſome power upon our inclinations, and on the things which depend on the *ſoul*: but I do not ſee that it hath the ſame power in natural changes, and things that depend purely of the *body*. To underſtand it clearly, Suppoſe that a man

man ſhould a hundred times hold ſome Combuſtible body very near the fire, you will ſee plainly that it will never accuſtom it ſelf to endure the power of it, without receiving harm; nay, on the contrary, it will conſume by little and little: Even ſo, if moiſture be contrary to the welfare of a body, it is very manifeſt that it will never accuſtom it ſelf ſo well to be moiſtened, but it will ſtill receive dammage from the wet. Since then this anſwer is not ſatisfactory, ſhould we not rather ſay, that there cannot be rendred any univerſal reaſon of it, but that it happens oftentimes for ſeveral particular reaſons, which have nothing of common, that many things ceaſe to hurt after that one hath been accuſtomed to them? As for example, *Cold* doth not hurt him that is uſed to endure it, becauſe it ſhuts up the pores and thickens the skin; and that he that hath a thick skin, and his pores cloſed, muſt needs be more

difficultly

difficultly hurt by external qualities. On the contrary, he that is used to walk bare-headed in the field, receives no hurt from the heat of the Sun, as may be seen in the *Bohemians* children, and in the Peasants of some part of *France*, by reason that this very heat hath sucked by little and little from their brains, all those humidities which might have bred Rheumes or Catarrhs. *Violent labour* also doth not hurt those that are used to it, for that it dryes the Nerves, and the Nerves cannot be dryed, but they are hardened, nor hardened without becoming stronger, and fitter either to bear a great weight, or to thrust a thing with vehemency. Or else, is there in it some gross mistake? and should we not rather say, that things which we are used to, do not cease to hurt, because they have lost the power to do it, through use: but that when a man hath long used a thing, without falling into any remarkable inconveni-

ence, it is a ſign it was not contrary to him at the firſt, although it ſeemed to be ſo: and therefore Phyſitians do very wiſely permit him to uſe it for the future. Or elſe (if we muſt however find out ſome reaſon common to all the effects which this Problem comprehends) doth it not conſiſt in this, that as oftentimes *Good* is in the *middle*, and *Evil* in the *extreams*; ſo alſo on the contrary that ſometimes *Evil* is only in the *mean*, and *Good* in the *extreams*, ſo that an hurtful thing having by length of time brought our temper into ſome extream, it may by this means deliver us from the evil which it brought upon us. But that *Evil is ſometimes in the middle, and Good in the extreams*, there are that prove it by ſeveral reaſons: For they ſay that the *higher* and the *lower* regions of the air are more calm then the *middle* region, in which ſtorms and tempeſts are formed; that the extream *force* or

extream *weakneſs* of the Suns rayes do equally render the air ſerene: but that when they have only a moderate force, they *raiſe* vapours which they cannot *ſcatter*: That man ſhould either not reaſon at all, but follow plain common ſenſe, as the Peaſants do, or elſe reaſon exactly and profoundly, and become truly learned; becauſe reaſoning by halves, and being learned by halves, is the way to embroyl ones ſelf in a thouſand doubts that others know not; that Angels and things inanimate are equally incapable of miſery; but that thoſe natures that are in the middle between theſe two extreams, are only ſubject unto it. Though theſe examples be taken from things far remote from the matter in hand, yet they may bring us to a belief that it is many times after the ſame manner in things which belong to the health of our bodies.

PROB.

PROB. 14.

Whence comes it, that (as it is the saying of some body) a great service is not so proper to gain our affection, as many petty services done in a continued secies and on all occasions?

IS it not because a *great service* may be received in an *instant*, whereas this train of petty services takes up in the gaining of our heart, a great deal of *time*, which must needs help forward the business mightily with all sorts of causes? Or else is it that when any ones beneficence descends upon us thus by little and little, and as it were *drop by drop*, we do at the several times we receive it, make more several reflections upon the obligation which he layes upon us, so that thus his benefits do *sink* the better to our hearts, like herein

to a *gentle* and *ſoft rain* falling by little and little, which penetrates better into the earth, whereas great and *violent ſhowers* only ſweep it and run away without ſoaking in? Or elſe, is it that this continued train of petty devoires and ſervices, each of which apart is not of any conſideration, leads us to amity and good liking by ſo ſweet and gentle a force, and brings us on ſo inſenſibly, that we perceive it not, and ſo make no reſiſtance? Or elſe, as we love more thoſe meats which having delighted the *palate* do not lie heavy upon our *ſtomacks*; do we not in ſome ſort love more for the ſame reaſon the ſervices that do us good, and yet leave no weight of neceſſary and forced *obligation* upon our *ſpirits*; as queſtionleſs petty ſervices often reiterated do, becauſe that on one ſide their number ſupplies their weakneſs, and makes them countervaile a great benefit all at once; and that on the other ſide they are of

ſuch a nature, that he which did them cannot handſomely reproach them to us? Whence it comes that the acknowledgement we preſerve of them in our minds, ſeems to us to be the more voluntary. Or elſe that which we ſearch for, proceeds it not hence, that he which doth us a great good turn, is believed by us to do it out of vanity, to gain the reputation of generouſneſs or bounty, becauſe a great ſervice makes a noiſe, and is expoſed to view; but that we cannot ſuſpect the ſame of him who is aſſiduous to render us a thouſand petty devoires, which appear not to the eyes of others, and are perceived only by our ſelves? Or elſe ſhall we ſay, that one may do us a great ſervice in our abſence, but that this train of petty ſervices preſuppoſes that he that would make himſelf be beloved, is not abſent from him by whom he deſires to be beloved: but that on the contrary, he converſes ordinarily

with him; and that this familiarity is that which aids him principally to inſinuate himſelf into our heart? Or laſtly, doth not this alſo contribute to it, that when we have received ſome notable benefit from another, as it is a thing commonly known, it happens many times, that thoſe whoſe intereſt it is to make us forget it, have ſo much artifice to extenuate it, to give it ill interpretations, and to take away its luſtre and weight, that they ſeduce us, and extinguiſh in us the reſentment which we ſhould have had of it; whereas when any one hath inſinuated himſelf into our favour, and hath witneſſed to us the ardour of his affections in many occurrences, by petty ſervices which have not been obſerved by others, the reſentment which we have thereof is not expoſed to the aſſaults of his enemies, or rivals; and he is ſo much the more aſſured, the more it is ſecret and the cauſe of it not known?

Prob. 15.

What is the reason that a great joy makes us facile to pardon injuries?

IT is certain that a great *joy* disposes us extreamly to clemency, that it *softens* our hearts, and expells that *hardness* and *bitterness* which injuries have caused in them, and makes us easie to pardon them; and as it is a thing certain, and such whereof the enquiry cannot be otherwise than curious, pleasant, and profitable; I conceive I have reason to allow it a place among'st these *Problems*, and endeavour to discover all the causes of it. In the first place then, I believe I shall speak a very great truth, if I say, that our soul being surprized on a sudden by a great happiness, finds it self secretly obliged to some *soveraign* power, and hath secret motions of *gratitude*

towards it; and that finding its ſelf unable to do it any good whereby to teſtifie its thanks, it is ſo much the more conſtrained to do good to his *works*, that is to ſay, that it becomes good, and diſpoſed to do good, even to thoſe that have wronged it. But beſides this reaſon, which without doubt contributes very much to the effect we ſpeak of, I conceive that *Joy* doth beſides of its own nature beautifie the *ſoul*, as well as it beautifies the *countenance*. And indeed, ſeeing that *Joy* is more according to nature than *Sadneſs*, ſeeing it is a *Good*, as Sadneſs is an *Evil*, it muſt needs for this reaſon inſpire alſo into it and waken the paſſions that are more conform to nature, and better than thoſe which are awakened by *Sadneſs*. Now there is nothing more according to nature then *Goodneſs*. If it be objected that *Affliction* corrects us, and makes us better; I anſwer, that it doth not do it out of its own nature, but by accident,

accident, as a medicine cures us by accident, although at other times it be a kind of poyſon, and is alwayes in ſome ſort contrary to the temper of our bodies. For if we conſider affliction in its ſelf, we ſhall finde that as it is the property of winter and ill weather to kill flowers and to deſpoile the trees of the ornament of their foliage, even ſo it blaſts the beauties of the ſoul, ſoures and debaſes it. But above all we ſhall finde, that in cooling and weakening the courage it greatly impaires that generoſity from whence iſſues the pardon of injuries. Philoſophers ſay that *Light* doth naturally beget *Heat*, although it be not a quality of the ſame *ſpecies* with it, by reaſon of a certain affinity or correſpondence of nature which is between them. I ſuppoſe it is for the ſame reaſon that *Joy* may beget in the ſoul goodneſs and vertuous inclinations, though its ſelf be not a vertuous inclination, ſince that being a

good paſſion, it muſt have ſome analogy with all the good paſſions, as *ſadneſs* muſt have alſo with all the bad ones. But to come to the conſideration of another cauſe of the ſame effect, it ſeems alſo that as an injury made us not angry, but out of an opinion we had that it had caſt us down, when any great proſperity comes to raiſe us up, it muſt for this reaſon appeaſe and ſweeten the grief which this pretended dejectment hath cauſed in us, ſince that it doth in ſome ſort do us reaſon. Or elſe, perhaps the ſoul, in a great proſperity, looking on the preſent which ſmiles upon it, and offers it nothing but matter of ſatisfaction, and a moſt perfect reſt, doth equally take its eye off, both from what is to come, and what is paſt, and therefore hates to remember paſſed injuries, ſince that it cannot do it without looking off from the preſent which is ſo grateful to it, and interrupting its delicious employment: but that which

which ſtill puts it more ſtrongly upon the ſame reſolution, is, that having all on a ſudden received a great bleſſing, it doth paſſionately deſire to enjoy it fully, and not corrupt the ſweetneſs thereof, and that there is nothing can ſo corrupt its ſweetneſs, as a motion of hatred and revenge. For as the act of *Loving* is in its ſelf naturally ſweet, becauſe it is very much according to nature: ſo the motions of *Hatred* are naturally painful and mingled with grief, becauſe they croſs nature; and becauſe the ſoul doth as I may ſo ſay, wreſt and diſtort its ſelf, in receiving them into it, and doth ill employ its faculties. Now that all motion of revenge and hatred of another is naturally painfull and mixed with grief, is a thing that may eaſily be proved. For, beſides that our own ſenſe makes us acknowledge it to be true, we need only to look upon the viſage of man in choler, to confeſſe that nothing doth more reſemble the

viſage of a man that is ſad; and there appears ſomething of painfull and forced, ſomewhat like to that one ſees in the face of a *Porter* employed with all his ſtrength to lift up a great burthen. It is even ſo alſo in all other motions of Hate. For in a word, it is as unimaginable, that a man ſhould machinate any *black* deſignes, and frame within himſelf ſome malicious contrivance, without loſing the native *quiet* and *ſerenitie* of his ſpirit, as that the air ſhould continue ſerene when it is formed into ſtorms and tempeſts, and that it ſhould be overſpread with dark clouds, before it pours down either hail or thunderbolts upon the earth. And as the ſpring of a Piſtol is not at reſt, and as it were in its due place, ſo long as it is cockt, and ready to give fire and kill: So our ſoul is without doubt reſtleſs, and out of its repoſe, ſo long as it continues as it were bent to the execution of ſome malicious act, and is ready to

do miſchief to another. And if we will deſcend from the conſideration of men to that of beaſts, we ſhall there alſo finde ſome teſtimonies of this truth, ſince that they which when they are alone, ſeem to take pleaſure in, conſidering the beauty of the day, of the meadows, of the rivers and forreſts, and are moſt lightſome and ſportive, are alſo the moſt innocent; and that, on the contrary, all the ſavage and blood-thirſty ones are ſad and melancholy, which may be ſeen both by their countenance, and in that they hate and fly the light. It is wiſdom therefore in us to drive from our mindes all malicious thoughts when we would fully enjoy any great happineſs: Or elſe, the joy which a good fortune cauſes in us, renders us ſweet and eaſie to pardon injuries, becauſe after having gotten *external* goods, we do the more violently deſire thoſe that reſpect the *ſoul*, namely *wiſdom*, and *vertue*, as thoſe only which we want,

want, and which remain to us to desire.

Prob. 16.

What is the reason there is so much false news spread abroad, and that many delight to make others believe strange things?

IS it not because a man thinks he doth not do very ill, nor transgresse much the Law of Liberty, to add to that which he receives from others, some small matter, or to take from it some petty and slight circumstance, which yet changes the whole face of the thing; an absurdity like to that of an ill pay-master, that thought he did not any great hurt, and was no dishoneſt man, in taking away a small cypher from a paper wherein his debt was contained, and in his defrauding his Creditor of a great sum under pretence that he

he took away and blotted out only a ſmall *cyfer*? Or elſe, do not falſe news ariſe principally from hence, that we wholly give credit to our friends when they tell us ſtrange things; and that, on the contrary, our friends enlarge the wonder to us, becauſe they ſee we are delighted with it, and that they are unwilling to deprive us of it by diſabuſing us, and take from us that delightful error in which we are, no more then they would wake us if they knew we were in a pleaſant dream? Or elſe, is it becauſe many men think they do well to make uſe of a *lye* to uphold the *Truth*? Or elſe, are we not chiefly deceived by falſe relations, becauſe we think it reaſonable to give credit to one that is no bad man, but hath on the contrary much of goodneſſe; whereas we ſhould conſider whether he be not guilty of ſome weakneſſe, becauſe a man lyes through *weakneſs* as well as *malice*? Or laſtly, may we

not ſay that ill news is ſpread principally for this reaſon, that many pleaſe themſelves in making others believe ſtrange things? the truth is, experience evidently diſcovers this malady with which they are affected; and if it be demanded why they are thus delighted with it, methinks one may ſay, it is either becauſe they would have theſe great and ſtrange things be ſo, and that being unable to give them a *real* exiſtence, they give them at leaſt a *ſhaddow* of it in printing them upon the ſpirits of men: Or that half-believing them, and taking pleaſure to believe them, they labour to confirme themſelves in their opinion, by drawing many others to be of it, and acquiring to it good ſtore of ſuffrages; or that being unable to believe them in any ſort, yet when they ſee that an another believes them, they contemplate the joy which they imprint on his eyes, and on his viſage, and hear the exclamations which admiration forces

forces from him, and the gestures it puts him in, and receive hereby some *reflection* of his pleasure; like in this to many sick people, who though they cannot eat themselves, yet delight to see others eat with a good appetite?

Prob. 17.

What is the reason that having been long on horse-back, a man doth better refresh himself by walking a little on foot, than by sitting still?

Is it not that as a *colour* is more contrary to a *colour* then to a *smell* or a *sound*, by the same reason one *motion* is more contrary to another *motion* then to *rest*, and so easier effaces the impression of it, by that Law which saith that things which are under the same *genus* do more vigorously combate one another? Or else, is it that the body of the horse

horſe, on which we have been a long time, hath too much preſſed many parts of ours, and by this means ſhut up certain paſſages; and that when we walk, the ſpirits running to theſe parts to move them, do raiſe them up, and by this means open whatſoever was there preſſed, or too much ſtraightned, ſo that they ſoon recover their natural ſituation?

Prob. 18.

What is the reaſon that when we come to reſt our ſelves after much walking we finde our ſelves more weary a while after?

Is it becauſe the heat which motion drew into our parts rendred them more ſupple, and obedient to the will, in dilitating the nerves; and that after we have reſted a while we have loſt this heat, but we have not loſt our wearineſſe? Or elſe, is it

is becauſe when we walk, our ſweat runs down; but when we come afterwards to reſt, it ſticks upon our skin and benums it, by its humidity, as alſo by its coldneſſe, when the repoſe of the body hath given it means to grow cold? We ſee by experience, that thoſe that come from ſwiming, feel their arms and legs weak, as if they had been beaten, by reaſon of a cold moiſture that reſts upou them. It is obſerved likewiſe, that when after a long motion we come to reſt our ſelves, we ſweat preſently much more; and this is becauſe the motion of the parts of our body doth not then hinder that by which the drops of ſweat do deſcend by their narrow paſſages, the pores. For, as every body knows, two ſeveral motions do very often hinder one the other.

PROB.

Prob. 19.

Why is it good not to let a wicked man that hath power to do what miſchief he pleaſe, perceive that we are jealous of him?

IT is good, firſt, becauſe he that would do wrong unjuſtly, hath yet need of a *pretence*, which how vain and frivolous ſoever it be, may at the leaſt amuſe his ſpirit, and hinder him from conſidering and clearly diſcerning the uglineſſe and injuſtice of his action. For, as he that is reſolved to be let blood, and hath ſtretched forth his arm, yet turns his head another way out of a certain horrour which nature hath of every thing that hurts any part of our body: So he that is reſolved to do an unjuſt and wicked action, doth yet turn away his eyes from the injuſtice which he ſees in it, out of a natural

a natural horrour, and endeavours not to see it at all, or at least to see it lesse clearly. This is very handsomely represented by *Esope*, in the fable of the *Wolfe* and the *Lamb* that drank at the side of the same river; for though the Wolfe was resolved to devour the Lamb, and saw that it was best for him to do it presently, for fear least any one should come to her succour, yet he stayed a while to reason with her, being not able to put himself on this action, without setting before his eyes some *colour* and *shew* of justice. He begins therefore to complain, that she *troubled* the water; but because she replied that this could not be, because she drank a great way *below* him, which was so clear a reason that it shut out all appearance of the contrary, he could not yet fall to the committing of this evil, but seeks another pretence somewhat lesse void of colour, in telling her that she knew well enough, that her

Father

Father and Mother and all her Anceſtors had been his enemies. Not but that this ſecond reaſon was very extravagant, ſeeing it was the ſole cruelty of the Wolfe, which had bred in the Anceſtors of the Lamb this hatred, which made them only *avoid*, not *wrong* him: but nevertheleſſe this pretence for want of another, ſerved to furniſh him with ſome appearance of Juſtice, without which nature cannot be moved or undertake any thing. According to this then, though a wicked man may be reſolved to do us a miſchief, and hath power to do it, yet he wants a pretence, which he may uſe towards himſelf, and whereby he may (if I may be bold to ſay ſo) finde obedience in his own faculties; We ſhould be therefore ſo far from venturing to furniſh him with one, that we ought carefully to remedy all things from which he may draw one. But we ſhall furniſh him with a pretence and ſhadow of reaſon, if we let him

ſee that we diſtruſt him, although it be not without juſt occaſion; and this ſhadow of reaſon will ſerve him to conquer that reſiſtance which he findes in his own nature. Secondly, it is good not to give wicked men any teſtimony that we diſtruſt them, becauſe if they believe that we cannot ſo much as imagine they are about to commit a great injuſtice, they will judge us the honeſter, and farther from all treacherous and evil thoughts, and ſo will be more aſhamed to ſin before us, and diſcover to us the baſeneſſe and ugline ſſe of their ſouls. Beſides, if a wicked man thinks that we eſteem him an honeſt man, he cannot without regret go about to deſtroy by his actions this belief which is advantageous and glorious to him; and will be ſo much the more loth to do it, as he believes, that it is well eſtabliſhed in our minds, becauſe that

in doing it, he ſees he wrongs himſelf: but on the contrary, if he thinks we have already an ill opinion of him, he will not have ſo great a deſire to acquire our eſteem, as he would to preſerve himſelf in it, were he poſſeſſed of it; becauſe the deſire of *preſerving* that which a man hath, is more natural then that of *getting*. In the fourth place, if he believe that we are in a profound and entire ignorance of the wrong he intends us, he ſees by the ſame means, that in doing it he will cauſe us more grief, then if we had expected it, and provided our ſelves for it. Now the wickedeſt man hath naturally more of repugnance to bring a great grief upon any one then a little one. Laſtly, beſides all theſe reaſons, there is this ſtill to be conſidered, that if any one thinks that men account him an honeſt man, or that they do not think him very

bad, this ſerves to perſwade him, that what is believed of him, is true, and that indeed he hath not very bad inclinations. Now there is no better, nor handſomer way of reforming by degrees the mind of a wicked man, then to perſwade him that he hath ſome ſeeds of vertue, and an inclination to worthy things, becauſe that loving himſelf, and every thing that is in him, he will conſequently love vertue, if he believes that it is one of his qualities, and a part of his being; and he will alſo love vertuous men if he thinks he is like them, as he would love a man that hath noſe or eyes like his own. In a word, it is certain that every one acts according to the *Idea* that he hath of himſelf, and according to that which he believes himſelf to be: for, thoſe objects which we have moſt ordinarily before our minds, do by degrees communicate their qualities to our

ſoul's

ſouls, and our actions; Now there is no object any man hath more frequently before his mind then himſelf, ſo that if he believes himſelf wicked, the image which he hath of himſelf muſt needs exaſperate him and make him ſtill worſe and worſe; On the contrary, if he thinks himſelf inclined to goodneſſe, this belief muſt needs ſweeten him by little and little and inſpire into him better inclinations. This is all we have to ſay upon this *Problem*, which methinks we have by this means ſufficiently illuſtrated: But yet we believe we ſhould by the way add, that the *Rule* which it gives, is not alwayes true; for herein are many *Diſtinctions* to be uſed: and eſpecially we muſt have a care, whether he whoſe injuſtice we fear, be a man *intirely* wicked, or whether he have *ſome* good principles, and be not yet fully reſolved to do injuſtly: For if he be abſolutely wicked, we muſt

not let him see that we distrust him, for the aforesaid reasons; but if he hath something of generous, and be not wholly confirmed in his evil resolution, it is many times good to let him perceive (but with humility and without bitterness, and rather obliquely then in a direct and open manner) that we see well enough he intends to wrong us, that our unhappiness is manifest unto us, and that we have not any hope. For, besides that this raises more pitty in him, it troubles him to be accounted more unjust then he is, and having something of generous in him, he labours to refute by his actions this ill opinion which we have of him, and desires to shew unto us that we were in an errour when we had such a conceit of him.

Prob. 20.

Whence comes it that Beaſts do naturally know how to ſwim, and that Man hath need to learn?

THey anſwer commonly, that Man doth not naturally know how to ſwim, as Beaſts do, becauſe that the firſt time he tryes to do it, he is ſeized with a *Fear* which hinders him from making uſe of his legs and arms freely. But I do not approve this anſwer; for beaſts have at leaſt as much fear as man, the firſt time one caſts them into the water; and I have ſeen ſome of them that would tremble for fear a long time after, and remain aſtoniſht, and for all that ceaſed not to ſwim very well. Beſides, if it were only *Fear* that hindred man from knowing how to ſwim, this would be nothing to them that are

very bold, and cast themselves without fear into great dangers; and a man in this case would know at least how to swim in the water of a *Bath*, in the midst of a company of his *friends*, since that then he would have nothing to fear: Or else he would know how to swim in a very narrow brook, where the bottom may be seen all the way, and can leave him no considerable fear. Since therefore this answer doth not suffice, and leaves the difficulty wholly untoucht: I conceive rather, that a man doth not naturally know how to swim, because the first time he tries, he cannot choose but manage his legs and arms by *Reason*, and that this hinders him from doing it right, because it is an action that must be done by the *imagination* only, after a brutish and blind manner. We see clearly by experience, that there are many things which we do worst, when we would do them by *Reason*. Besides, I believe it is

naught for a man, the firſt time he tries to ſwim, to be prepoſſeſt with this belief, that he doth not know how to ſwim; whereas beaſts are exempt from all this preoccupation: for, to believe infallibly that one doth not know how to do any thing, is a diſpoſition to do it ill, and to come ſcurvily off. But, beſides theſe two reaſons, in my opinion it is very remarkable, that when beaſts ſwim, they are in their *natural* poſture, becauſe they have not an *erect* ſtature; and do move according as they have an inclination to move naturally, namely, with all their feet at once; and that on the contrary, man lying at his length upon the water to ſwim, is not in the poſture in which he ſhould naturally be, and ſo hath the greater pains to move himſelf in this manner, as even upon the earth it would be painful to him to march upon all four. Or elſe I may ſay upon this ſubject, that the difficulty is not ſo much to know why crea-

ture

tures that are much more *light* than man, are more proper to ſwim; but why he doth not know how to ſwim as well as Oxen, horſes, and ſuch other creatures that are *heavier* than he: To which I anſwer, that it is becauſe Oxen, and Horſes, and ſuch other beaſts, have an inward capacity and cavity of their bodies much greater, which is the cauſe that though their bodies ſink deeper under water by reaſon of their weight, there yet remains part thereof above; and that it happens to them as it doth to veſſels that are high built, to wit, that they continue above the water, whileſt others that are not ſo much laden, but are much leſs, do ſink. Or elſe too, one may rationnlly ſay, that beaſts do naturally ſwim, becauſe they have for the moſt part a longer neck than man, ſo that although all the reſt of the body be heavy enough to ſink under water, yet in holdlng up their necks they take their breath at eaſe;

whereas mans body being ready naturally to ſink under water as well as theirs, he hath not a neck long enough, to keep his head notwithſtanding out of the water, and by this means keep himſelf from being choaked. So then *Beaſts* have in this received from nature divers advantages above *Man*, in which ſhe hath not done him any wrong, but on the contrary hath manifeſted the ſame wiſdom which ſhe ſhews in all other things, that ſhe is guided by a moſt admirable and penetrating judgement, which fore-ſees things that depend upon a long train of conſequences. For, this wiſdom foreſaw that *Man* only among all other creatures ſhould know how to make *Boats* and *Bridges*, or to paſs the rivers on *Horſ back*.

Prob. 21.

What is the reaſon that the fruits which grow at the tops of the boughs are the beſt?

IS it becauſe that which is moſt *earthy* and *groſs* in the nouriſhment, cannot reach to the tops of the boughs, ſo that they receive only that which is more *ſubtile*, and doth eaſier find paſſage through the narrow ſtreights of the wood? Or elſe, is it becauſe that the tops of the branches are the *neweſt* and *youngeſt* parts of the tree, and that for this reaſon they have the more vertue? Or elſe, is it for that the fruit which grows at the tops of the boughs, are more expoſed to the rayes of the *Sun*, which ripens them better? Or elſe, becauſe they are more expoſed to the beating of the rain, which ſerves to ſoften their hardneſs, and

to make them alſo ſweeter; as we ſee that fruit is ſometimes ſoftned between our hands, and made ſweeter according as we handle it? Or elſe is it, that when there is abundance of nouriſhment in a tree, it paſſeth to the extremities, after it hath provided for the neceſſities of all the other places; but that being arrived at the extremities, and not able to paſs further, it amuſes it ſelf, and ſo feeds thoſe fruits that grow there the better, which conſequently muſt have more of juice and of ſavour. Methinks one may expreſs the courſe of this nouriſhment by the example of a brook, which runs as long as it finds any way, but meeting at laſt ſome obſtacle which is laid before it, and hinders it from paſſing further, it ſwells and gathers its waters into an heap. Or elſe, laſtly, is it that the nouriſhment, according as it aſcends from the root to the branches, is ſtill more and more concocted by the *Natural heat* of the

the tree; so that for this cause it must needs be that which comes to the ends of the branches, must be most concocted, and most purified?

Prob. 22.

Why do good men think they ought to speak in proper terms of other Passions and Vices, but not of things that regard wantonness and corporal Love?

Some antient Philosophers discoursing upon the same Question which we have here propounded, have though that this modesty which hinders us from speaking plainly of things that belong to lasciviousness, and the lower and more terrestrial part of Love, was but an abuse and vain ceremonie. Their reasons were, that since we speak in plain terms of all other vices, whereof some are far worse, and that we

dare pronounce the names of *Treason*, *Sacriledge*, *Impiety*, *Assassination*, *Cruelty*, there is no colour of Reason why we should not with the same boldness speak of *vicious Love*, much less that we should not dare to speak of all the effects of *lawful Love*, which hath nothing in it irregular. Whereunto they added, that whatever one might *do* without sin, one might also *speak* without sin. *Montaigne* seems to have been of the same opinion; for in the first Chapter of the third Book of his *Essaies*, he saies, *that the rule which forbids us to express some things in plain terms, is a false rule, and that he scorns to reckon it amongst his true duties.* He saies afterwards, *that it is the* Daughter *indeed of true wisdom, as other things which respect Ceremony, but a* bastard *one; and that he which should undeceive the world of it, would not perhaps do so much mischief, because man acquitting himself of these false offices, thinks himself discharged*

charged of so much of the obligation which he hath to natural offices. At last he adds, *that it is only a sparing of Vice, not to dare speak of it, but by a Periphrasis.* For my part, I think that the general opinion of men which is contrary hereto, must needs be better grounded, and that they have reason to look upon it as a piece of brutishness in those that speak plainly of whatsoever belongs to corporeal Love. And I do justly call this opinion *general*, whatever *Montaigne* was pleased to say, since there is no true History found by which it may be proved that there was ever any people wholly void of this modesty; and although there have been some, doubtless it was only a savage people, and scarcely participant of common sense, as certain Nations that have been lately discovered. And a thing doth not cease to be of *common* sense, though it be contradicted out of simplicity by some *particular* people. And though we could

could not tell how to anſwer to the ſubtilties here alledged againſt the general opinion, yet in my judgement it were not wiſdom to diſbelieve it, and follow them. But for all that, I conceive the truth being on our ſide, will furniſh us with arguments to prove, that the objections which are urged againſt it, are weak and ill-grounded. For in the firſt place, *Montaigne* himſelf, in that Chapter where he is ſo much againſt the common opinion in this buſineſs, doth nevertheleſs confeſs, *that there is no action which ought ſo much to humble a man, as this which is here in queſtion; that they are the feet of the Peacock which abate his pride; that our weakneſs and vanity appear there in their beſt apparrel; that when he conſiders the circumſtances of it, he believes that ſaying of the Antients, That man was made by the gods to ſerve them for a May-game; that all other actions admit a wiſe and diſcreet proceeding, except this only; that all*

other

other Passions trouble reason and assail it, but that this doth wholly annihilate it. I think that in all this he saith nothing but truth, but we may from hence draw arguments against himself; and indeed this truth being supposed, we have ground to say, that then it is impudent and vitious to speak openly of a thing, where the inconstancy of our judgement and the weakness of our nature seems to be at its best, after a particular manner, because it is a sign that he which doth it, doth not much trouble himself with the perfection and dignity of his soul; and that he doth without regret discover the defects and vanities of it. If it be further objected, that yet we speak openly of *Perfidiousness, Sacriledge, Ingratitude and Cruelty*; To this I answer, that good men indeed do openly and without scruple, speak of these things, and that no man is offended at it, because it is presupposed, they are things to which they are not subject.

ject. It is not ſo in the follies and ſordid things which *Love* makes men commit, when for hope of a corporal pleaſure, it makes a man ſubmit himſelf with too much weakneſs to that ſex, which nature hath made inferiour to him: For they are follies to which the beſt have been ſubject; they are weakneſſes from which good men are not totally exempt; and even thoſe which abominate all Cruelties, Treaſons, Thefts and Ingratitudes, and hate them with a perfect hatred, do yet find themſelves weak on this ſide; and that is the reaſon they cannot ſpeak of the more baſe and brutiſh part of this paſſion without bluſhing: and truly they would be impudent, if herein the memory of their infirmity did not produce this effect in them, and if they ſhould ſpeak openly and boldly of their vice, inſtead of avoiding the repreſentation of it to themſelves by formal and direct expreſſions. To confeſs that this is ſo,

it,

it is to be considered, that we should think a rogue impudent and brutish without measure, if being surprized in the fact, and being questioned of the manner in which he committed his theft, he should speak of it at large, and with all the circumstances, without blushing and casting down his eyes for shame; and that on the contrary we should think he had some remainders of probity left in him, when he dares not speak of it but with difficulty and by halves, making us guess his meaning, rather than expressing it. Even so a man that we know hath committed a notable Treason, would be thought very impudent, if he should in company make long discourses of Traytors and Treason, and if on the contrary such kind of discourse should not put him into a kind of confusion. In a word, it becomes him that knows himself guilty, to be ashamed of every thing that represents to him his fault. And as for that which

was

was ſaid, *that it is only a ſparing the vice of wantonneſs, not to ſpeak as openly of it as of others*, it is as ill-grounded as the reſt. For as for a lye, parricide, murther, impiety, avarice, cowardize and vanity, becauſe they are things which have an uglineſs, which is *eſſential* to them, and therefore inſeparable, it is very true, that the more lively one can deſcribe them, the more hatred and horrour he raiſes of them; nay it may be maintained, that a lively conception of them is enough to make one fly them, without the aſſiſtance of any other diſcourſe; juſt as men run away from blows, or from an houſe on fire, without any need of perſwaſions. But it is quite otherwiſe in Corporal Love; for it hath no *eſſential* deformity, and is bad only by *accident*, namely, for want of neceſſary *circumſtances*; and when it carries us in purſuit of its object with *exceſs*, or by baſe and unworthy *means*. And therefore to moderate

derate it, it is not at all neeeſſary to ſet it forth to the life, but on the contrary, by how much the more lively and in proper terms it is deſcribed, ſo much the more doth the imagination of thoſe that hear ſo indiſcreet a leſſon, grow warm with that baſe heat which it is accuſtomed to kindle there. And hence I draw one ſtrong reaſon more, in favour of that truth I maintain. For ſince that to ſpeak in proper terms of this low and ignoble part of Love, is rather helping than weakening it, he that diſcourſes of it in this manner, muſt needs have a deſign to render it more violent, either in himſelf or others; both which are equally beaſtly. Or elſe it muſt needs be, that at the ſame time, he that talks thus, and that he is with his friends, whoſe converſe ought to elevate his ſoul to nobler and more ſpiritual pleaſures, he feels himſelf moved with that laſcivious and terreſtrial ardour; otherwiſe he would

never

never love to repreſent to himſelf the effects thereof ſo diſtinctly, becauſe they are of ſuch a nature, that if the imagination be not delighted with them, it is wounded by them, it being not poſſible there ſhould be a *medium* between theſe two extreams.

Prob. 23.

Whence comes it that they ſay, whatſoever cures us, and is good for us, diſlikes us; and that on the contrary, we love that which hurts us?

IS it that in this they do not ſay true, but that as the Time whileſt we are in ſadneſs ſeems to us longer, for the ſame reaſon the accidents which are offenſive to us, ſeem to us the more frequent? Truly I think that from this Source deſcend many other *Vulgar Errours*; as for example theſe; That a man is hurt ſooner

ſooner in the ſame part where he is already ill : That the wittieſt children do commonly die before they can give their parents that contentment which they hope for from them : That diſaſters follow one another, and ſcarce ever come ſingle: For as we deſire that theſe accidents ſhould never happen, ſo for fear leaſt they happen, we think that they happen alwayes. Or elſe, doth not the errour wherein men are in this buſineſs, proceed from hence, that when we love that which profits us, no man takes any notice of it, becauſe it is a thing conformable to Reaſon and Nature, and upon which our ſpirit ſlides away ſmoothly, as our hand ſlides upon a poliſhed body, where it finds no rub or obſtacle; and that on the contrary, when we love that which hurts us, as it is a thing that aſtoniſhes us, and makes us ſtick ſome time to ſearch the cauſes of it, ſo we ſee it the better, and imprint it the deeper into our memories.

memories ? Or elſe happens it not thus, in effect, through the imperfection of finite things, which produces alſo many other effects, that ſeem to be againſt nature ? As for example, we ſee that Difficulty *whets* the appetite, whereas it ſhould rather *dull* it; and that Evil is more active then Good, although it ought to be quite contrary, and many other the like things, ſo that this may perſwade us, that it is through this very imperfection that wholſom things offend, and hurtful things delight us ? Or elſe, is it becauſe the remedy ought to be contrary to the diſeaſe, and that contraries redouble their force againſt one another by an *Antiperiſtaſis* ? Phyſick for this reaſon doth at firſt heighten the diſeaſe, and conſequently alſo the pain. And as Phyſick doth at firſt re-inforce and heighten the diſeaſe, may it not alſo be that hurtful things for the ſame reaſon do delight us more often at the firſt, and encreaſe our vigour,

vigour, and that therefore they pleaſe us? If we ſuppoſe for example, that a man be ſick for want of *heat*, it may be if he uſes *cold* things that are naught for him, they will at the firſt refreſh him and give him ſome ſtrength, by making of his heat increaſe, and redouble it ſelf by an *Antiperiſtaſis*. Or elſe, is not nature at firſt delighted with things that redouble its evil, becauſe that by increaſing it, they may in ſome ſort ſtupifie and dull its ſenſe? And is it not, on the contrary, hurt by thoſe things that cure it? becauſe that in reſtoring it to its ſtrength by little and little, they do as it were awaken it out of that lethargie in which the diſeaſe held it, and ſo make the ſenſe of it the more quick? Or elſe, is it that Nature when ſhe hath need to be cured, is depraved and ill diſpoſed: ſo that it is no wonder if in this condition ſhe be offended with that which is good, and pleaſed with that which is bad for her? Or

elſe,

elſe, is it not that as a man cannot take a ſpot out of his *clothes* without making the place a little more thredbare, nor refine *mettals* without diminiſhing them, nor cauſe any great good in a *Common-wealth* without wrong to ſome: ſo alſo we cannot cure our *bodies* of any great infirmity, but we muſt do it ſome dammage; and that as the remedy in curing us, doth us ſome hurt, this is the reaſon why it is irkſom to the ſenſe? If you ask me in particular, What is the reaſon that almoſt all Medicines are bitter, and odious to take? (wherein methinks a great part of the difficulty of this Problem conſiſts) I anſwer, that this happens from its quality, becauſe if the Medicine were not offenſive to the *palate*, neither would it offend the *ſtomach*, ſeeing that it is from one and the ſame quality, that things which have been diſpleaſing to the taſte when they were in the mouth, do excite alſo a ſenſe of horrour in

the ſtomach and offend it. Now, if the Medicine do not raiſe a ſenſe of horrour in our ſtomachs, Nature would not uſe its utmoſt ſtrength to rid it ſelf of it, and would not reject together with it, the ill humours that made it ſick: for I think it is very probable, that it is by this means that moſt Medicines purge us.

PROB. 24.

What is the reaſon that Children in Winter, though their face and hands ſeem to ſhow that they are more afflicted with cold than men grown, yet are not eaſily perſwaded to warm themſelves?

IS it not becauſe to warm themſelves they muſt *ſtand ſtill* a good while in the ſame place, and that Children love to be conſtantly in *motion*, out of a kind of Impatience, which is natural to our ſpirit at that

age?

age ? Or elſe is it, that when they are cold and come nigh to the fire, its heat at firſt inſtead of comforting, doth more afflict them ; which happens, becauſe it re-inforceth at firſt the cold of their bodies by an *Antiperiſtaſis* ; and that as they want experience and reaſon, and follow the firſt ſentiment of nature, they reject this wholſom remedy for want of knowledge to judge, that by and by they ſhall find comfort by it ? Or elſe is it, that though their bodies be more eaſily altered by the cold, then thoſe of full grown men, as it is plain to the eye ; yet this alteration is not ſo painful and grievous to them ; the reaſon of it is, becauſe the cold hurts chiefly by too much hardening and making ſtiff all the parts of our body, and that theirs are ſo tender and ſo ſoft, that by reaſon thereof, they cannot but very hardly be brought into the contrary extream ?

PROB. 25.

Whence comes it that when we are in affliction, we are better diverted by the repreſentation of ſome Tragick Hiſtory, or by the recital of ſome great misfortune, then by more merry ſhews, or facetious tales?

IS it that the ſoul, being lively afflicted, ſhuns light and vain joyes, becauſe that without truely comforting it, and without taking away the grounds of its affliction, they do only dilate the ſpirits by a ſuperficial emotion of pleaſure, with which they tickle the imagination, and that this dilatation of the ſpirits cannot be but offenſive to the ſoul, if it ſtill keeps its ſadneſſe at the bottom of the heart, ſince that it is for its good, and to the end that it may have the more ſtrength, it keeps them together in affliction? Indeed

it ſeems to be for this reaſon chiefly, that the ſoul being thus afflicted, doth thus fly from gay and delightſome objects, and loves ſad ones; juſt as a weak eye hates chearful and light colours; and on the contrary, loves ſuch as are dark and have but little light. Or elſe, when we are profoundly afflicted, and are preſent at ſhows full of mirth, are we not diſpleaſed to ſee others laugh there with a moſt pure and perfect joy, becauſe this doth more ſadly put us in mind of our own misfortune: whereas in hearing read, or ſeeing acted a Tragick hiſtory we finde our ſelves leſſe unhappy by conſidering the miſeries befallen others? Or elſe, doth not the recital of other folks misfortune comfort us, chiefly for this reaſon, that for a time they take off our thoughts and affections to our ſelves, and fix them upon a foraign object? Or elſe, is it that as they ſay nothing doth better drive out one love then another love? for

the ſame reaſon nothing doth better expell one ſad thought then another. Without doubt this reaſon is upon good ground, and to ſpeak more generally, when ever one deſires to take away from a man wholly and for ever, any ſtrong paſſion, one ſhould endeavour to put him firſt into ſome other paſſion that is nigh it. For when we have wrought any change in a mind that had given it ſelf up through length of time to ſome certain inclinations, we may after that bring him to what we pleaſe; as we ſee that when a man hath moved a ſtone a little out of its place, which long lying had faſtened to the earth, afterwards he draws it whither he pleaſes; Or elſe the ſadneſſe which Tragedies and other ſuch like ſpectacles beget, is it not more apt to diminiſh afflictions, then are other things more ſportful, for this univerſal reaſon, That an evil is alwayes more eaſily cured by another evil, then by a good, which

happens thus, becauſe to go from evil to good is a longer way, and muſt receive a greater change then to paſſe from one evil to another.

PROB. 26.

Why do ſome noiſes make a man ſleep?

IS it that noiſes which one hears near at hand being only a *motion* of the *air*, or at leaſt ſuch as cannot be formed unleſs the air be moved, do excite ſome *motion* in the organs of the *brain*, by ſtriking the air encloſed in the ears; and that this motion being very proper to hinder the operation of the ſpirit, makes a man ſleep? Or elſe, doth not the noiſe of wind or rain, or of a ſpring make us ſleep, by *delighting* us? And therefore we ſee alſo that many fall aſleep more eaſily when they make ſome part of their body be rubbed, through the *pleaſure* that comes

comes of it; and that children alſo ſleep ſooner and with the more facility, when we rock them, becauſe they *love* to be rocked? Indeed, that *pleaſure* may help to produce ſleep, methinks may further be proved, in that they which are in a great and profound pleaſure, whether of body or of mind, do ſhut their eyes, ſtretch their arms carelesly, and continue in the ſame poſture, as if they were really aſleep, and that we ſay pleaſure puts a man as it were into a ſound. But why hath Pleaſure this property to be more apt to cauſe ſleep then the other paſſions of the ſoul? Is it not that the paſſions being neceſſarily either pleaſures, or griefs, or deſires, or hopes, or fears, the ſoul that hopes, or fears, or deſires, or ſuffers, is in ſolliciteude, and ſeaches every thing, and therefore it ſets its reaſon on work, and ſo hinders it ſelf of being ſeized by ſleep, whereas when it is in pleaſure, it ſearches after nothing, being

content with the preſent, and therefore its reaſon ceaſes to act, and by ceaſing to act cauſes ſleep to enſue; juſt as Night comes when the Sun ceaſeth to ſhine. Beſides, noiſes that tickle the ear, do make us ſleep, not only becauſe they give us *pleaſure*, but alſo becauſe this pleaſure is altogether *ſenſual*. For a *ſpiritual pleaſure* makes us imploy our *reaſon*, and ſo keeps up within us this *internal light* of the mind, which doth no leſſe hinder us from ſleeping then an *external* light which ſtrikes upon our eyes; and on the contrary, a pleaſure meerly *corporal*, is an obſtacle to *meditation*. But why of ſenſual pleaſures doth that of *hearing* produce ſleep? Is it not becauſe it is that only which we can admit in an intire repoſe of the whole body, and without doing any thing on our part? For, for example, the pleaſures that come from delightful *ſavours*, cannot be taſted without moving the tongue and jaws; and

we cannot also well enjoy a good *odour* if we do not make some effort to draw it in and smell it, nor can we well admit the pleasures of the *eye* without turning the eyes this way and that, and without straining to hold them open, by drawing back towards the forehead the skin that covers them: but to *Hear* you cannot say we should need to do any such thing; Or else may we not explain this *Problem* thus, that a pleasant noise which strikes the Ear, produceth first a suspension and cessation of all other thoughts, by that sweetness which charms us, and afterwards takes from us even the sence of it self: because an object that hath been long present to the faculty, strikes it no more, and is not perceived; which appears in that *Custom* is so proper to render both good and bad things insensible to us, and that he which hath long had his mind fixt upon a work, that he composes, becomes unable to judge

rightly of it, untill he hath for a while given his mind ſome other object? But why muſt the noiſes which make one ſleep, be in ſome ſort *uniform*? and why, for inſtance, doth the noiſe of a *ſpring*, becauſe it is all of one kind, make us ſleep better then of a *muſical inſtrument*, which yet is more ſweet? Is it that in noiſes which are not uniform, the ſame object is not alwaies preſent to the faculty, that they have in them *grave* or *ſharpe* ſounds, *high* or *low*, *ſlower* or *ſwifter* ones; whereas in noiſes that are uniform, it is preciſely the ſame object which is alwayes preſent to the facu'ty, and that by this means it may, after it hath effaced all other objects of our thoughts, efface it ſelf alſo, and make it ſelf imperceivable, by the continuance of its action, as we ſaid, and ſo beget ſleep? Or elſe is it that the pleaſure which is given us by the noiſe of a brook or a fountain, is a pleaſure purely *ſenſual* and of the

ear

ear only; but that the pleaſure, which the harmony of a muſical inſtrument creates, is not a pleaſure of the ear only, but alſo of the *imagination* and of the *memory*, ſince that a man muſt compare in it one concord with another, and conſider the proportion of the ſounds to one another, to diſlike or approve it; and that ſeeing it exerciſeth the fancy and the memory, it is not to be wondred, if it be not ſo proper to make a man ſleep?

Prob. 27.

What is the reaſon we aggravate our miſeries, and love to perſwade others that we are very unfortunate?

IF we ſearch why we aggravate our misfortunes, we cannot deceive our ſelves in ſaying it is to perſwade others that we are very unfortunate.

But

But it is a greater difficulty to know for what reaſon we deſire they ſhould believe ſo, becauſe oftentimes they are perſons that we do not hope to receive any ſuccour from, and that our very miſery rendring us leſſe able to be uſeful to others, may hinder many baſe and mercenary minds from doing us any good. To enquire then the cauſe of this humour of the afflicted; is it not, in the firſt place, that they are never aſſured that any man may not for the future be in a capacity to help him; and therefore they tell their misfortunes to all they ſee, and aggravate them to them, to the end that if hereafter they ſhould diſcover any means to ſuccour them, the pitty which they have raiſed in them, may preſently produce its effect? Or elſe do they deſire to have all that come near them know their evil, and believe it to be very great, thereby to incite them to give them ſome conſolation? Or do they not hope, that he to whom they have

ag-

aggravated their miſery, if he be not able to help them, may at the leaſt pray for them, and that theſe prayers may prevail with the divine goodneſſe? Or elſe, do they not deſire that thoſe very perſons from whom they cannot hope for any ſuccour, ſhould bemoane them, for that they think that ſome body elſe that ſhall have the means to deliver them from their miſeries, will do it ſo much the more willingly, if he ſees that many perſons do compaſſionate him, and are affected therewith, becauſe the more general the good is which we are intreated to do, and the more perſons it regards, the more ready are we to do it? Or elſe is it that *to be beloved* being in it ſelf a good, we do therefore exaggerate our miſeries, thereby to raiſe pitty, and by pitty love, becauſe we know naturally that pitty is ſo near to love, that there is nothing more eaſie then to ſlip from one to the other? Or elſe, do we not deſire that a man ſhould believe

believe that we ſuffer very much, becauſe we deſire he ſhould talk much and long of us, both while we live and after our death, and that we foreſee that men will talk ſo much the more of us, as they think that our miſeries have been great? Or is it not out of a vain affectation of glory which is annexed to conſtancy, and to be in ſome ſort admired by others, that we paint forth as very exceſſive, incomparable, and in a word, much greater then they are, the evils which men ſee we ſuffer with ſo much patience, our Vanity being ſo eſſential and united to our ſouls, that Grief it ſelf cannot expell it, and that that accompanies it even in the midſt of torments, upon the Rack, and at the Stake, as the *Stoicks* ſaid of their Wiſemans Happineſſe? Or elſe, do we aggravate our miſeries, becauſe through humane weakneſſe, we do in our miſeries many times think that the Providence which governs the Univerſe,

doth

doth us ſome kind of wrong, and that to prove it, we dare not alledge our perfections, and our innocence; but we alledge only the evils which it ſends us, which we ſay are greater then all that ever man ſuffered? Or elſe, becauſe we believe that all things have their courſe in the world, and ſucceed one another; do we not for this reaſon delight to perſwade our ſelves, that we have been for the time paſt very unhappy, to the end that we may build upon this foundation hopes of being happy for the future, and of ſeeing our felicity return in its courſe, as the Day returns after Night, Summer after Winter, and Fair weather after a long Storm? Or as *Cæſar* very wiſely painted forth to his Souldiers the enemies forces much greater then they were, to the end that afterwards ſeeing them leſſe, they ſhould leſſe fear them, and be provided of reſolution and courage more then enough; doth not our ſoul by a

like

like artifice fain to its ſelf its misfortunes greater then they are, to the end that afterwards returning to conſider the truth of the buſineſſe, it may receive ſome comfort in undeceiving its ſelf; and that when the violence of its evil ſhall return to oppreſſe it, it may have laid in a large proviſion of courage, and find its ſelf provided of more conſtancy then is requiſite for the undergoing of it? Or elſe do we not aggravate our miſeries, to provoke our ſelves to *weep* more abundantly, becauſe we finde that *tears* are a refreſhment to us; and therefore alſo in Tragedies, afflicted perſons do commonly exhort one another to ſhed abundance of Tears? Or elſe, to conclude, do we thus aggravate our evils, becauſe we think that great and excellent things, having only great deſtinies, either in good or evil, it is ſome token of elevation and excellence to have been exerciſed by great evils? If any man

object to me, that herein we ſhould make but a ſimple conſequence; I do freely confeſſe it; but I believe he will alſo grant me, that the mind of man hath very many weakneſſes and follies, and eſpecially that he is ſo paſſionate for his own excellence, that he lets not ſlip by in vain the leaſt ſhaddow of the leaſt mark that he can give to himſelf of it. And therefore we ſee many men blame themſelves for having a bad memory, that from thence they may draw ſome advantage for their judgement, becauſe though they ſee this conſequence cannot but be very weak, ſince that there are everywhere thouſands of blockheads that have neither memory nor judgement, yet they think that this is ſome ſlight ſign of it, becauſe of an opinion that is received by many to this purpoſe, the truth whereof we do not here examine: and that which is yet more, you pleaſe men, if you only tell them that they have an

head made like ſome very able man, whom every body reverences and eſteems; nay they pleaſe themſelves to believe they reſemble him in their hair, or gate; or, briefly, in having any air of his, nay to believe that they have had a deſtiny like to his, and like ſucceſs in certain encounters. For, as in judgements of Law-ſuits, there are ſome things which being not able to paſs for entire proofs, do paſs for ſemiproofs, or yet for leſs; ſo our ſoul in the midſt of reaſons, by which it labours to prove its own excellence, receives very vain ones, not as entire proofs, but as things which being collected and amaſſed in a ſufficient large number, do give it means to flatter it ſelf with ſome fancy which is advantageous to it, and to attribute to it ſelf very likely ſome perfection.

PROB.

PROB. 28.

Why do many laugh to see another man fall?

THere are some who propounding this Question, answer in one word, that it is out of malice. And if a man object to them, that many of those that laugh at such a mischance, do not cease to have very honest minds, and a great deal of true goodness: They might answer, that a soul really good, may yet have, together with its goodness, some light mixture of malice; as we see there is scarcely a man so wise that hath not some light weakness of spirit: As when we say a man is sanguine, we do not mean that he hath not a drop of Phlegm, Choler, or Melancholy humour in his body, but only that sanguine is predominant in him; so when we say a man

is

is wiſe, good, or ingenuous, we are not bound to conceive him exempt and wholly purged from folly and vice; For in truth it ſignifits no more then that Wiſdom, Vertue and Ingenuity are his predominant qualities: Nevertheleſs, it is clear that in thoſe that laugh when they ſee one fall, it is not properly malice; which I inferr, not only becauſe they do not laugh if he take any conſiderable hurt, but alſo and chiefly becauſe they are as ready to laugh at themſelves, if by chance they burn or cut their own fingers; or if the wind blow their hats off, or if they are ſurprized, or caught with a ſhower before they can get any ſhelter, or if any other petty diſorder befalls them, the reaſon is, becauſe theſe petty diſorders have alwayes in them ſomething of *groteſque*, *extraordinary* and *ſudden*; and becauſe by theſe three qualities they do in ſome ſort tickle the imagination.

PROB. 29.

What is the reaſon that thoſe who embrace Civil and Worldly affairs with too violent an ardour, are ſubject to loſe all ſenſe of Religion, and the knowledge of a Deity?

THough we had not learnt from the authority of the Holy Scriptures, that the care of the things of the world, and the deceit of riches, do blind the underſtandings of men in reſpect of the myſteries of Faith, experience would ſufficiently prove it; ſince that it happens even at this day very frequent, that thoſe which ſettle their affections too much on the affairs of the world, and have in their minds no other deſigns but of worldly advancements, do ſo loſe the ſenſe of the verities of Religion that there remains to them only an outward profeſſion of it, with which,

as

as with a ſuperficial kind of beauty, they cover the irregularity of their opinions. To ſay from hence, that they wiſh there were no true Religion, that they might give themſelves the more liberty to compleat their deſigns all manner of wayes, and that they labour all they can to perſwade themſelves of it, and at laſt do perſwade themſelves, it is to ſay very much, but perhaps not altogether enough, becauſe many times it happens that the more we deſire to chaſe out of our minds a belief, the leſs able are we to do it. It muſt therefore be added further, that as thoſe who addict themſelves to the contemplation of things ſublime and abſtract, do become unfit for low things, ſuch as are the affairs of the world: So by the ſame reaſon, thoſe that exerciſe their minds too much about low things, and ſuch as fall under the eye, muſt become unfit for the diſcerning of ſublime things, for that our ſoul is ſo miſer-

able

able that it can hardly gain on one ſide but it loſes on the other, and its perfections do very often ſhock one againſt another, and are incompetible. But beſides theſe two reaſons, there is a third more nice and not ſo eaſily to be perceived. The better to comprehend it, we muſt firſt conſider, that when our eyes have been too long fixed upon the Sun, there do remain upon them ſome certain impreſſions, which make us think we ſee its image in all the objects we look on: So when our mind is ſtrongly faſtened upon the conſideration of any one object, it thinks that it ſees it everywhere elſe, and is alſo ready to believe that every one looks upon that which he doth with a great deal of earneſtneſs, as he that hath long turned round, believes that all things turn with him. Thus, for example, a man of an *Amorous* complexion, all whoſe deſires look only at Love, is apt to think that all things in the world are

un-

undertaken for Love; that it is this which for the moſt part playes his own game under the maſque of Ambition, or ſome other paſſion; and that even wars, and all the greateſt troubles of State, are only the effects of ſome ſecret Love. But an *Ambitious* man, out of the love he bears to Glory, takes it quite otherwiſe, and believes rather that all is done out of Ambition; that Covetouſneſs it ſelf looks at that indirectly; that Learning, as well as War, aims at nothing elſe; and that in Love it ſelf, the Ambition to conquer the mind of a Miſtriſs, or to ſurmount a Rival, are our principal motives. A *Souldier* will be ready to think that Learning hath no other rational end but the Military Art; but on the contrary a *Scholler* will judge that War hath no other end but to provide that wiſe men may quietly and peaceably apply themſelves to contemplation. An *Orator* will tell you that Philoſophy was invented

only

only to move the passions of the Judges handsomly and with a dress. But on the contrary, a *Philosopher* will rather judge that Eloquence hath no other end but the application of Philosophie. It follows then, according to the preceding Doctrine, that when a man that hath already a propension to impiety, hath the affairs of the world too much in his head, and the means by which they are brought about; and he thinks, night and day, of nothing but politick tricks and gins by which he may entrap others; This imagination by little and little becomes plausible to him: That Religion it self is an artifice that tends to the bringing about of these very affairs of the world; and that it is a State-device of the Politicians, because he thinks that every one looks upon that which himself doth with abundance of affection, and thinks he sees everywhere else the same objects which his own mind is filled with, and to which

which he is too much addicted.

Prob. 30.

What is the reaſon that the loweſt ſpirits are commonly moſt perſwaded of the truth of their opinions?

IS it not becauſe that as the earth and groſs bodies have this advantage over the nobleſt and moſt ſubtile ones, that they are more firm in their places, and cannot ſo eaſily be removed; ſo groſs and dull ſouls have certain advantages over others, amongſt which this muſt be reckoned to be firm in their opinions? Or ſhould we not rather ſay that this is rather a diſadvantage to them, and that it is harder to take away their errours, then to take from wiſe men their ſound belief; for the ſame reaſon that makes it harder to cure a man of a diſeaſe than

than to make him ſick? Or elſe, is it not that as a man that ſtands on tiptoes, cannot be ſo firm in this poſture as he is in that lies along and keeps himſelf with all his weight on the ground: So wiſe men cannot be ſo firm in their opinions, to which they came only by forcing and ſtraining themſelves, as fools are in theirs, into which they ſuffered themſelves to fall as it were with all their weight, being far from ſtriving to raiſe themſelves up again? Or elſe, is it that baſe opinions are upheld by the ſuffrage of the multitude, and that it is not to be wondered at, if that makes us couragiouſly embrace an opinion, ſince it makes us without fear to run upon death, and aſſures us againſt the greateſt dangers? Or elſe laſtly, is it that fools for want of judgement, do not for the moſt part underſtand the reaſon of the able; and that on the contrary, able men do by their vivacity conceive the reaſons which fools object

againſt them, better then they do themſelves, and that this difference is alike proper to make thoſe more reſolute, and to weaken ſomething the aſſurance of theſe?

Prob. 31.

Whence is it that in the greateſt ſubjects of affliction, we do many times take up more readily a conſtant reſolution, then in others that are much lighter?

It is principally for two cauſes. Firſt, that when we are much afraid of any misfortune, and look upon it as the greateſt that can happen to us, this fear makes us very often to think of it; ſo that when it befalls us, we are already prepared for it, and that for this reaſon many times we are more eaſily reſolute therein, contrary to the expectation of all men. The ſecond is

that a great misfortune disabuſes us of the too great eſteem which we ſet on the things of the world, and of the happineſs which may be gotten in it, and proves to us on the contrary by our own experience, that all things are very fickle and inconſtant. Thus then it makes us contemn it, and by that great blow which it gives us, doth as it were cut the roots by which we were tyed unto it: In a word, by afflicting us on the one ſide, it comforts us on the other, and furniſhes us with weapons againſt it ſelf.

PROB. 32.

Wherefore are old men great talkers?

OLd men have thoughts that vex and perplex them, when they come once to be entertained with much leiſure; either becauſe they have diſcovered vanity in all things:

or becauſe old age in which they are, ſets before their eyes as ſoon as they entertain themſelves in this manner, many grand incommodities, into which they are ready to fall, and laſtly, the moſt inevitable of all evils, which is Death. They ſeek therefore to divert their minds from theſe vexatious thoughts by all means, and hither tend their houſhold cares, to which, for this reaſon, they apply themſelves very earneſtly; but when they have nothing to do, they can only Hear, or Talk, or Read, to hinder that melancholy which their mind would give to it ſelf in too great a leſure. But *Hearing* is not ſufficient to divert their minds from thoughts that wound them, becauſe governing themſelves wholly by their own judgement, they give no great attention to the thonghts of others, or contemn them, as making account that they themſelves have others taken up upon better grounds. As for *Reading*, it is an em-

ployment, which beſides that it is hurtful for them, dulls their faculties, which Age hath rendred leſs quick, becauſe it hath nothing that doth enough affect the ſenſes and the mind. It is then only when they *Talk* that their minds do in good earneſt loſe the image of thoſe things that afflict and trouble them, and diverts the ſight from every thing that inſpires it with melancholy. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if they are much delighted therewith. Or elſe, as *Fruit* falls more eaſily from the tree when it is ripe: ſo our *Conceits* come more fluently from us, how careful ſoever we be to keep them in, when they are full ripe, and that we have cleared and well digeſted them. Now old mens are ſuch, becauſe they are wiſe, and have made many reflections, which have diſabuſed them of many errours. Or elſe, laſtly, they are Talkers, for ſeveral particular reaſons, as for inſtance, if they are

present at any solemnity or great show, they have then less curiosity then others, because they have often seen the like; therefore, instead of being attentive to see, they suffer themselves often to make large discourses, which being then very offensive to those that are near them, hath so much the more easily gotten them the name of great Talkers. Just so also, if they are at a Feast, they have less appetite then others, and are sooner satisfied. And therefore, were it only out of civility, they are obliged to Talk, which incommodating those that by this means see themselves bound to make long replyes, makes them so much the more blame this vice. Moreover, after the repast, they are also carried away with a desire to Talk much, to keep themselves from sleeping, because they know well it is a thing they are subject to. These are then, it seems, the principal causes of the effect we speak of, though there may be also many others.

PROB.

Prob. 33.

Whence comes it, that in all kind of things, those that do but meanly in them, are more severe and rigid Judges of others, then those that excell therein, and hold the first rank?

DO not people very much deceive themselves, when they think that to *dislike all things*, is a token of *delicacy of judgement*; whereas on the contrary, they should say, that a squeamishness both in body and mind, is a sign of sickness; and as an healthful man likes well brown bread, and less delicate viands; so a spirit of a strong and vigorous health, ought to be pleased with all things, wherein it sees shine never so little of perfection, although it will perceive the difference that is betwixt them and others; which being

ing thus supposed, our Problem remains without difficulty; Or else shall we say, that the inclination easily to condemn others, proceeds from rudeness, and a want of natural sweetness, which is not to be found in minds that have an entire and perfect beauty, because it is a great uglines; as on the contrary, it is a great part of the beauty of the mind to have sweet and gentle thoughts, to be ready to excuse the faults of others, and not to contemn any one? Or else as we see often, that *petty Lords* are less accostable than the *great ones*, and maintain a gravity fuller of pride, because their authority being not so well founded as that of these later, they think they must thus uphold it, by surly and arrogant looks, and by a brutish impudence: Is it not just so in the meaner wits, and do they not use this severity to condemn others, for to separate themselves thereby from the common, and labour to maintain

tain the authority they usurp, and which they perceive hath not footing and *basis* enough to uphold it self? Or else as *subordinate Judges*, are very often more severe and rigorous in their judgements then the *Soveraigns*, because it is not in their power to remit any thing of the severity of the Law: the meaner wits, are they not more hard many times to excuse a thing that is against the ordinary rules, because it is for great minds only to grant a dispensation from those rules upon certain occasions; and because those that have meaner abilities, ought not to be bold therein, nor are they, for fear, lest whiles they desire to excuse others, they be blamed themselves? Or else is it, that meaner spirits are not willing to confess in others a moderate worth, because it is troublesom to have many companions; but that when a man doth *excell* in some kind of thing, he is glad that many others do but *meanly*

in it, because it is glorious and delightful to have a great many *inferiours*? Or is it not, lastly, because great spirits love the truth more, and have more of ingenuity and of good breeding to acknowledge the perfection that is in another, and to publish it with all sincerity: but the meaner sort are not alwayes capable of so pure and clean a candour, and do many times dissemble their judgements upon some design? It is certain indeed, that many petty passions which they cannot rid themselves of, are capable to alter their good nature, and hinder them from confessing with sufficient magnanimity anothers worth. For sometimes they will not confess it out of an appetite of *revenge*, which some slight words hath raised in them; sometime they refuse to do it out of some motion of *emulation* and *envy*; sometimes it is not properly out of *envy* that they are loth to own a merit far above their own, but because so *high*

a

a perfection doth more plainly discover to them their own *littleness*, and by this means makes them sad. Or else it may be, if they have once begun to blame a thing, they will not *unsay* it out of *obstinacy*, and lest they acknowledge they were deceived. Or else, they will not confess that another hath any worth, out of fear lest somebody should thence inferr by a long consequence, that they themselves have none: Or if they have no interest to obscure anothers glory, there will be some *friend* of theirs, or else some one that is of the same *City*, or of the same *Countrey*, or of the same *Party* that they are, whom this interest will concern, and they will not preferr before him one that is *indifferent*, or a *stranger*, or of a *contrary Party*. In a word, there are besides many other causes more slight and more nice, which change the candour of their words, and make them deny, either in whole or in part, the perfection

fection of another: but great minds are free from these weaknesses, and undefiled with this filth, because they are less interessed, and therefore worth finds more equity at their hands, and is more easily owned.

Prob. 34.

Whence comes it that it is so easie to blame and find fault, that the least able do it best, and that it is much more hard to commend?

Is it not because there is much more ill than good in humane things, and that those which are the most perfect, are yet very imperfect, if a man examine them strictly, and with a desire to find fault? But this being supposed, that the most perfect things in this world have very great defects: Whence comes it that the meanest wits do take notice of them much more easily then they do

do the perfections? Is it not because being ill-sighted, they see only that which exceeds, and is very great in the subjects they examine, and that as we said, the evil doth alwayes exceed? Or else, doth not the imperfection of the objects more lively affect the mind, than their perfection; for the same reason that that which hurts our bodies, is much more lively felt, then that which delights them? Or else is it, that to acknowledge worth, and to commend it, one must first know wherein the perfection and truth of things consists; but that to know and to prove that another man is not arrived at it, one needs only know wherein they do not consist. Indeed this reason seems to be most true, and to be able sufficiently to clear the difficulty of this *Problem*. For it is so easie to say wherein things do not consist, that after this manner we know the nature of *God* himself, since that being ignorant *what he is*, we do never-

nevertheleſs know him by *negation*, and we know that he is not any thing *material*, any thing *viſible*, any thing *mortal*, and that he is *incapeable of change*, and of the leaſt *defect*; ſo that without being able to deſcribe his greatneſs, we can eaſily blame and reprove thoſe that ſpeak too lowly of him. After the ſame manner, it is very eaſie to tell where the *Center of a circle* is not, and the leaſt child can point out with his finger many places which are not the middle of it: but to know where it is, there is need of skill, time, and inſtruments. But if we muſt ſtill ſearch out another reaſon for the ſame effect, conſiſts it not in this, that as one that ſwims is carryed by the very ſame water which he ſtrikes, which he thruſts from him, and which he troubles: ſo he that reproves and combates any one, and doth all he can to decry him, is born up by his inventions, becauſe that he affirms nothing of himſelf, and doth only

maintain

maintain that, what he whom he censures sayes, being supposed, such and such things do follow: So that by this means he discourses oftentimes successfully of many things which he understands not, nor sees the grounds of. Truly it seems to be so; For, for instance, though I know not what a *Half-moon*, a *Counterscarpe*, or a *Bastion* is, it is clear notwithstanding, that when he that discourses of them before me, shall come to contradict himself, either directly or indirectly, I may in using these terms which I understand not, reproach to him his contradictions, fight against him with those arms which he hath put into my hands, and appear more able and more understanding by this censure of him, then indeed I am. On the contrary, to commend any one with success, one must not suppose for ttue, any thing that he saies, but must prove and maintain it by reasons fetcht elswhere.

Prob. 35.

What is the reason that when the Winter hath been very cold, they commonly say the Summer that follows will be very hot?

THere are sometimes some slight things, the clearing whereof fails not to bring some light to our common sense, and in this number one may reckon this, which at first sight hath some difficulty, by reason that one would think the quite contrary, that if the Winter hath very much cooled the Earth and Air, they should be the more difficultly heated by the following Summer. Is it therefore quite otherwise, that the heat of the Summer finding the earth and air very cold, doth redouble its violence by the opposition of its contrary? Or else do they say so, because they see that one contrary doth

doth naturally ſucceed another in the ſame degree; as for example the water doth naturally aſcend as much as it hath deſcended; the exceſs of heat in a feaver ariſeth to the ſame violence with the exceſs of cold; great friendſhips leave behind them great enmities; and great diſpleaſures, when they end, produce extream contentments; after an extraordinary cloudy and wet ſeaſon, we enjoy an extraordinary ſerenity and purity of air, and much fairer then that which went before it; and one that is recovered from a great ſickneſs, hath commonly better health then he had before, and recovers a ſoundneſs that is more firme and of a greater value, then that which he had loſt. Or elſe is it that when the Winter hath been extraordinary cold, it hath alſo been neceſſarily dry, by the ſame reaſon the earth being very dry is diſpoſed to receive a great heat? Or elſe that when it hath been long cold, it is a ſign, that

the

the matter of the cold and Northern wind, or of the other cauſes that do cool the air, is ſpent for a long time, and therefore it is likely it will be very hot?

Prob. 36.

What is the reaſon that Fear makes ones hair ſtand on end?

For the clearing of this Problem, I think it is needful to conſider in the firſt place that *Admiration* and *Fear* have ſome affinity, and do often accompany one another. Which being ſo, it ſeems that as *Admiration* makes a *Chilneſs* run through ones whole body, by reaſon that it brings into the ſoul a certain ſhadow of *Fear*. So *Fear* makes the hair ſtand on end, out of ſome mixture of *Admiration*. Indeed this ſeems ſo much the more probable, becauſe the frights which make the

the hair ſtand on end, muſt ſpring from a danger whoſe image preſently ſtrikes the ſoul, and yet it knows no cauſe of it, and that thoſe frights which come upon us when we think we ſee dead men, or Ghoſts, or Devils, do chiefly produce this effect, becauſe they are not only *fearful* things, but alſo very *admirable*, as being ſupernatural. *Virgil* hath excellently well comprized this; for when he would expreſſe the *Fear* which the ghoſt of his wife *Creuſa* ſtrook into *Æneas*, the prodigy of *Polydorus*'s tomb, the arrival of *Mercury*, that came to bring him a meſſage from *Jupiter*; or the *Fear* that *Turnus* was in, ſeeing an infernal monſter flap his buckler with its wings: upon all theſe occaſions he puts down this circumſtance, that their hair ſtood up right, becauſe that all theſe things were as *Admirable* as *terrible*: But in other kinds of fear, he is contented to mention only *coldneſs* and *trembling*.

And

And if any demand of me why *Admiration* makes the hair to ſtand up right? I anſwer, that the ſoul, having its faculties intent on the conſideration of that which appears admirable, doth alſo contract the organs of the brain, and with them the skin that covers the head. Now a man may eaſily imagine that we cannot contract this skin, but by pulling it up, nor pull it up but the hairs will ſtare a little. It is true that the motion of *fear* doth alſo contribute thereto, becauſe it makes one *cold*, and that a part of our body cannot be *cold* without being a little more contracted then before.

PROB.

PROB. 37.

Whence comes it that many being in a frenzy, have ſpoke Latin or Greek, without having ever learned either of theſe langnages?

MAny of thoſe that have examined this Queſtion, endeavouring to rid themſelves of the great difficulty which it preſents at firſt to the mind, have in my judgement made uſe of ſuch anſwers, as are more againſt all appearance of reaſon, then the Queſtion it ſelf, and given us remedies worſe then the diſeaſe: For they would give ſuch ſtrange force to our imagination, that no man of a ſound judgement is able to give credit to their vain diſcourſes. Wherefore omitting all that they have ſaid of it, we will ſearch only amongſt known cauſes, according to our cuſtom, the

reaſon of ſo marvellous an effect. *Firſt* then it is remarkable, that thoſe words, which many being in a frenzy have pronounced in a tongue which they knew not, have been ordinarily *Latin* or *Greek*, or ſometimes *Hebrew*, according to the report of thoſe that have treated of them. In the *ſecond* place I ſuppoſe that the words which they have thus ſpoken, did not make any diſcourſe that was coherent or that was pertinent to that which was asked them, ſince that the tranſports of their frenzy hindred them from diſcourſing rationally. Theſe two things being thus ſuppoſed, one may add, that although thoſe that have ſpoken *Latin*, *Greek*, or *Hebrew* in a frenzy, never *ſtudied* it, and yet they eaſily may have heard thoſe words before which they ſpoke, ſeeing that theſe three languages are commonly taught throughout *Europe*, and that private houſes and thoſe places which are ſet apart for

ſpeaking in publick, do very often retain them. Now it is poſſible that theſe words, at the ſame time when they heard them, made ſome impreſſion in the organs of their memories, which through its weakneſs did not appear to them, untill they fell into madneſs; becauſe that the heat of the frenzy by its immoderate ſubtilizing of the ſpirits of the brain, renders the ſenſe of the imagination ſo quick and ſo delicate, that there cannot be in its organs any impreſſions ſo weak which it diſcovers not and is lively enough affected with it. And that the images of certain things can lodge in our memories, and we have no knowledge of them at all, becauſe they are only painted very weakly, and as it were with dead colours, may ſufficiently be proved by *Reminiſcence*, which brings to our minds many things which we thought we had utterly forgotten. Beſides many otherlike impreſſions,

are alſo made oftentimes in the other organs of our faculties, and we never perceive it; and it is not to be doubted, for example, but that when the weather is about to change, our bodies, although we perceive nothing on it, do receive within them ſome change, as well as thoſe of birds that thereby do preſage fair or foul weather. In the *third* place, one may confeſs that certain images may be imprinted in our organs without being perceived, after the example of a man that is very ſhort-ſighted, who doth queſtionleſs, for all that, receive the images of objects very far diſtant, becauſe that he would ſee them if on a ſuddain, the power which he hath of ſeeing ſhould become more ſubtile and quick. And if any man wonders not that theſe freneticks we ſpeak of, are able to retain, and conſerve a long time in their memories the images which they do not know are there, but that the words which they

they heard only by the by, ſhould be able to leave there any light and weak picture of themſelves. He muſt remember that beſides that the organs of the memory are without doubt very delicate, and very ſuſceptible of all impreſſions, the activity of natural things is marvellous, and hath many times much greater extent then we believe. For, for example, could we eaſily perſwade our ſelves, that a beaſt that runs can in running imprint its ſent in all the places where it goes, if the dogs of chaſe did not prove it; and when we have handled a ring of glaſs, or ſilver, or gold, would we believe at the firſt, that ſo ſmall touching of it ſhould take away any thing from it: and yet Philoſophers hold that it muſt needs be ſo, ſince that at length we diminiſh it ſenſibly by handling it? I add further that it is not neceſſary, that the perſons we now ſpeak, of ſhould have heard thoſe words they pronounce in their

frenzy, only once; they may have heard them two or three ſeveral times, and a man muſt the leſs wonder that we have the images of things without knowing it, when he conſiders that our very deſires are hidden from us, when they are as yet very feeble, and newly born.

PROB. 38.

What is the reaſon that a too earneſt entreaty makes us unwilling inſtead of inciting us to grant that which is deſired of us?

IS it not becauſe man being a rational creature and one that ought to act freely, loves to lead himſelf the dance in all his actions, and to have the beginning of them in himſelf; and that when one deſires to conſtrain him with too much ardour and violence to any thing, he thinks he is rather *drawn* by this ardour

ardour and preſſing importunity, then put upon it of *himſelf*, which conſequently diſpleaſes him, and makes his will more cold inſtead of heating it? Or elſe, is it becauſe he which begs of us earneſtly, makes us foreſee plainly enough, that we cannot deny him his deſire without putting him into a great choler, and making him our enemy, that is to ſay, that he provides for us his enmity, as it were a puniſhment in caſe we fail of compliance toward him, in which our mind ſees yet a greater image of conſtraint, and that which diſpleaſeth it more? for it hates nothing ſo much, as to ſeem to do a thing out of fear. Or elſe, is it becauſe we judge, that he which deſires a thing with immoderate and exceſſive paſſion, is apt to tell a lie to gain it, ſooner then another man that deſires it with leſs violence; and that he doth purpoſely conceal from us ſome circumſtance, which would make his requeſt unreaſonable, and

unjuſt? Or elſe, is it becauſe that which is very violently deſired, ſeems to us of more conſequence; and that in things of conſequence, we are wont to demur and conſider a good while before we reſolve any thing, becauſe we are affraid of committing ſome great errour? Or elſe is it becauſe he which prayes us with too much earneſtneſs, ſayes many things which make us believe that he hath his eye faſtened only upon his own intereſt, and that he regards only the good or evil that may happen to him upon our denyal or conſent, and not on the good or evil that may befall us, which we diſlike with ſome reaſon, as being unjuſt: for, according to equity and reaſon, he that would have us be diſpoſed to do good to him, ought alſo on his part to wiſh us well, and that in deſiring of us an act of good-will toward him, he have not a will indifferent toward us? Or elſe laſtly, is it not becauſe too earneſt prayers and ſu-

plicati

plications are commonly accompanied with too low and baſe a ſubmiſſion, and a too ſervile flattery, which commonly do quite contrary to that a man thinks they ſhould? It is manifeſt indeed that a too low and ſordid ſubmiſſion is apt to be contemned, and every one knows it well enough; but that which deceives men, is, that oftentimes they do not conſider long enough before the conſequences of this contempt, and ſee not that it not only extinguiſhes *Affection* in us, but alſo inclines us even to *Hatred*, juſt as *Pity* inclines us to *Love*. Beſides, the ſubmiſſion that any one renders to us, is not more apt to pleaſe us, and by this means to get ſome benefit of us, then to make us think it comes from a baſe and dejected mind, ſince that all the advantage we can finde in it, proceeds only from the mind that it comes from: and as for the exceſſive praiſes which are given us by him that deſires to

obtain some favour from us by his too base flattery, if we think that they do not come from the heart, we consider them only as so many cheats; and if we believe that he doth really esteem us, with that excess as he makes shew of, first, we do not much thank him for it, because the esteem which a man hath of any one, is a thing forced, and depends not on him that gives it; and in the second place, we do not now take so much care to preserve and augment this esteem in him by our benefits as thinking it both great enough and well enough established, whereas when any one respects us, but with more moderation, we labour what we can to encrease this esteem by our beneficence, and take care to cherish and cultivate (as I may so say) a belief, which we see is both profitable and glorious to us.

PROP

Prob. 39.

What are the causes of the marvelous things which we observe in the Silk-worm?

TO say the truth, there is nothing so admirable as that which no body admires. Those which we call *occult qualities* in the Elements, or in other things, may have the most *common causes*, like Juglers tricks, which seem to be grand mysteries, before one hath discovered them: but *Man*, whose ordinary operations and common motions we do not at all admire, offers us nevertheless in these operations and motions far more worthy subjects of astonishment; his *Passions* are more admirable then the *ebbing* and *flowing of the sea*; the power of his *understanding* over his *Will*, more marvelous then the influence of the

Stars;

Stars; the operations of his *Senſes* are of much more difficult explication, then all thoſe of the *Loadſtone*; *and he is a great marvail that admires little ones.* Not to go too far in this diſcourſe, the conſideration of the marvels which are diſcovered in the Silk-worms, may furniſh us with ſome proofs of it: they ſeem at firſt ſight to ſurpaſs or equal the things that are moſt ſtrange; and thoſe that have deſcribed them, have not been able ſufficiently to admire that this creature ſhould be killed by the ſole noiſe of thunder, that it ſhould have an inſtinct to ſpin unprofitably, and even with the loſs of its life, ſeeing that it ſtifles it ſelf in its own work, that it can draw out of its body that Silk of which it compoſes it; that a long time after it is dead, it revives; that it transforms it ſelf into a Butterfly, and after it is thus transformed, it can live ſtill many dayes without meat, that is to ſay, to the end of its life. But how ſtrange ſoever

all these things seem, I conceive that if we would consider them somewhat exactly, we should perswade our selves, that there is no necessity of leaving the bounds of common and ordinary causes to unvail and clear the secrets of them; and to do it, I will lay down only two things; First, that Silk-worms are excessive *cold*; and Secondly, that they are full, and as I may so say, overglutted with an excessive *moisture*: their *moisture* is apparent of its self to our sight, since that it makes them wholly transparent; and it is credible, that it is this that renders them so fruitful. Their extream *coldness* may also be felt by our hands, and doth besides discover it self by certain reasons to our minds, seeing that in the midst of Summer, if the weather come to be a little coldish, they dye with cold, which doth not befall any other creature; and seeing those which take the pains to keep them, are carefull to keep them very warm,

and in a place that is not expoſed to the Northwind. Theſe two things being thus ſuppoſed, it is no wonder in the firſt place that the noiſe of thunder kills them; this manifeſtly proceeds from the fear which ſo terrible a noiſe cauſes in them; for they muſt needs be very fearful, ſince that they are ſo cold and are void of blood; and when fear adds its coldneſs to that which is natural to them, ſo violent an exceſs may eaſily deprive them of life. Now as the Silkworm is very cold, and when it begins to grow old, its natural frigidity by this means encreaſing, it is not to be wondred at that it ſeeks to envelop and cover it ſelf, to the end that it may be warm: for all other creatures being preſſed with cold, do the like, and ſearch out holes wherein they lie in the ſtraw, and enwrap themſelves even in the cloaths and hangings of our houſes, to be the leſs troubled with it. Hereto ſerves the Silk which it vomits,

mits, and we must not wonder that it can vomit this rich matter; for it is nothing but the remainders of its nourishment which its too weak heat cannot digest, and as it were a superfluous humour which their abundance of it hath caused. Besides, when it puts it forth, it is not dry, but viscous, and hath a clammy moistness: but presently after the air hardens and dries it, as if it were glue. Being thus covered for warmth, it is not stifled as folks believe; nature doth not give creatures any instincts that are so destructive to them. It dies not unless by a *natural* death for want of strength, but rather it makes its *Bed* when we think it builds its *Sepulcher*, and *sleeps* when we believe it *dyes*. And indeed, if we open this pretended grave, after that we believe it is dead, we shall clearly perceive that it is only in a profound sleep; its natural frigidity, which even before it thus locked it self up, caused it to

sleep

ſleep longer then ordinarily other creatures do, making it ſleep much longer, ſince it lockt it ſelf up enveloped as it is in ſilk, which it wiſely drew out of its own body to caſt round about it; it grows a little warm by reaſon that its heat is on all ſides hindred from exhaling, and driven back, juſt as a man becomes warm by means of the cloaths he covers himſelf with. But whence comes it, you will ſay, that it tranſforms it ſelf into a Butterfly? I anſwer, that there is no colour to ſay it is *transformed*; that the Wings it acquires were due to it from its birth; that nature intended it ſhould flye with them: but that they could not grow out, untill that being covered with ſilk, which it vomited, it had gotten together a little more heat, to ſtrengthen its *vegetative* faculty, and enable it to put them forth, as it doth to that of *Trees*, to put forth their fruits, leaves and flowers, the production whereof

was

was formerly hindred by the coldneſs of the Winter. Nor doth this happen only to *Silk-worms*; for *Caterpillers* ſpin the like upon trees, locking themſelves up in their own work, and being there, they get wings as well as theſe. But that which further proves to us, that the heat of the Silk-worm, uniting it ſelf, after the manner aforeſaid, may ſerve to put forth its wings, is, that *flying* Serpents are to be ſeen only in very *hot* Countries, by reaſon it ſeems, that the extream heat of the air, ſupplying the defect of the coldneſs of their temper, gives their formative faculty power to produce them. But if we muſt ſay that they are transformed, and that they change their nature in acquiring *wings*, becauſe that immediately after their birth they have none, we muſt for the ſame reaſon ſay, that many other creatures are transformed when they acquire *Teeth*, *Nails* or *Horns*, which they had

had not when they were born, and that the very birds are transformed when they get wings, ſince that when they were hatcht they had none. The Silk-worm therefore is not transformed, but only becomes able to fly ſomewhat ſlowlier; and to conclude my ſtory, it is reaſonable we ſhould believe, that after it hath ſlept much, the ſame cauſe that awakens other creatures, awakens this alſo: Then doth wiſe nature make it vomit forth a thin ſharp moiſture; which helps it to gnaw that ſilk, which it was on all ſides environed with, and by this means out it comes and continues for many dayes, and even to the end of its life, without eating any thing, wherein conſiſts the laſt marvel that we are to ſpeak of. But I conceive we may eaſily gueſs the cauſe of it, if we remember, that it hath a very great moiſture joyned with a very ſmall heat: for we ſhall ſee that this ſmall heat muſt finde

for a long time ſufficient aliment in this great moiſture, without having need to receive any other; and hereupon might be alledged the ſtrange ſtory of a *German* maid, that having a very weak heat, and a body full of a viſcous and clammy humour, continued ſome whole years without eating or drinking. Now as this temper of the Silk-worm diſcovers to us the cauſe why it can live ſo long without meat: So this entire abſtinence, in which it paſſes a great part of its life, may be a new confirmation to us, that it hath the ſame temper which we attributed to it at firſt. For though for a certain ſeaſon it eats abundantly enough, of which there may be eaſily ſome other particular reaſon; yet conſidering its whole life in groſs, it muſt paſs for one of the ſobereſt creatures. Theſe are then, in my opinion, the cauſes of whatſoever appears marvelous in the

Silk-

Silk-worm. If any one hath a mind to think that there are more ſtrange and more occult ones, it is not my intent, that this diſcourſe ſhould hinder him; But yet I believe that as we oftentimes do not ſee many things becauſe they are too *far* diſtant from the eyes of our mind, ſo at other times we do not ſee them becauſe they are too *near*, and that we ſearch at the other end of the world for that which lyes before our noſes, and that the great eagerneſs that our underſtanding uſes to arrive at their cauſes, makes it go much beyond them.

PROB.

PROB. 40.

Why are good men often-times subject to a light promptitude of Choler?

DO they not only seem to be so, because they are more free and open, and so know not how to dissemble the smallest anger, and least discontentments that arise in them; but let them presently appear in their eyes and words: whereas those that are less free, do conceal them what they can possibly? Or else, is it that those that have honest and good minds, are angry for many things that regard not their particular interests? as for example, for the glory of *God*, and for any thing that respects *Honesty* and *Piety*, so that as these are general things which come every moment into our discourse, ordinary conversation offers them more often occasion to speak with

heat

heat and emotion, and in ſome ſort to be provoked: whereas a brutiſh man, to whom all things are indifferent except his own proper intereſt, can hear without any diſturbance, all kind of diſcourſe which he is not the ſubject of, be they never ſo ſtrange; which makes him often appear more ſweet and gentle, becauſe his intereſts being ſome particular things, and little known to others, they ſcarce ever come to be the matter of a common diſcourſe? Or elſe, may we not give light to this Problem, by that which *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that Choler is enclined to obey Reaſon, but that it obeyes it too ſoon, and ſtayes not until the firſt appearance of Reaſon hath given place to another more clear and ſolid? And may it not be ſaid, that if ſo, it muſt needs be, that good minds muſt naturally have ſome ſeeds of a light promptitude to Choler, becauſe the inclination readily to obey Reaſon, is without doubt a good diſpo-

ſition

ſition of mind, and a token of excellence, though by accident there may ariſe from it vitious actions and other inconveniencies? Or elſe, may we not add further, that one ſhall have leſs reaſon to wonder, that Good men have many times ſuch a diſpoſition, if it be conſidered, that there are ſome kinds of Anger ſo handſom, that one may maintain they mark out more of Goodneſs, Tenderneſs, and Love of good, than even motions of Pitty or Goodwill; becauſe in the motions of Affection and Pitty, the ſoul doth meerly deſire to do good; but thoſe of a generous and laudable Anger, are the motions of a ſoul that doth ſo much love good and hate evil, that it troubles it ſelf at it even to fury, and becomes fooliſh for a time? It may indeed be further alledged in favour of this Paradox, that the tenderneſs of nature of any creature appears not ſo much; for example, when it takes care to give

food

food to its little ones, as when full of anger and as it were in a fury, it layes on load with its wings, or horns, or other arms that Nature hath given it, on thoſe that would come too near them. Or elſe, in concluſion we may ſay, that there are certain emotions of choler, in which a man hath no intentions to do any hurt to thoſe of whom he complains with ſharp words; but rather to incite them to produce their juſtifications, to be able to find them innocent, or leſs culpable, and to continue by this means to love them: ſo that as they do not proceed out of malice, but tenderneſs, there is no cauſe to wonder that good men are ſubject thereunto, and that they ſhew a good nature, like in this to Lightnings, that appear in Summer evenings, and are oftentimes ſigns of *fair* weather, whereas they ſhould ſeem rather to preſage *foul*.

PROB.

Prob. 41.

Whence comes it that they say, The Love of Grand-fathers to their Grand-children, is greater then that of their Fathers?

Is it not because a man attains through longer cares to have a Grand-child, then to have a Son; and that always that which we acquire through more care, is more dear to us? Or else, is not a Grand-child dearer, because it hath been a long time desired? Or else, do we not look upon it as a more rare favour, and such as heaven communicates only to few persons, which makes us love it the more, because generally all rare things have a particular allurement for our minds? Or else, is not a Grand-child more beloved of his Grand-father then of his Father, because that his Grand-

father, as being more old, and nigher his death, doth for this reaſon deſire the more to live again in another? Or elſe, is it becauſe the love we bear to thoſe that proceed from us, ariſing from a deſire to extend our being ſucceſſively to many generations, he that by this natural courſe is more removed, ſhews to us this deſign more advanced, and ſo doth more touch our inclinations? Or elſe, is it becauſe the Father loves his Son only for his own ſake, but the Grand-father loves him for his own ſake and for his Sons ſake too, and ſees in him the image of himſelf, and of him whom he hath begotten, and that theſe two divers conſiderations do produce in him two divers tenderneſſes very powerful? Indeed this reaſon is very likely: for to go about to object, that the Father hath likewiſe two divers cauſes of loving his Son, becauſe he may love him for the Grand-fathers ſake, this makes nothing to the purpoſe;

ſince that, as every one knows, the affection which blood inſpires, hath much leſs force in aſcending than in deſcending. But if ſtill another reaſon muſt be given of this *Problem*, one may alſo ſay, that perhaps the affection of Grand-fathers doth only ſeem to be greater then that of Fathers, becauſe the Son being in a more particular manner the very blood and ſubſtance of the Father; the Father for this reaſon thinks that to love him very much, is to love himſelf very much, and that therefore he conceals and keeps in theſe motions of it, for fear leſt they betray too much weakneſs and ſelf-love: Whereas a Grand-father being not ſo much touched with this conſideration, doth the more give himſelf over to the violences of his Love, and dares more freely manifeſt it, as judging the exceſs thereof leſs ſhameful.

PROB.

PROB. 42.

Why is it that a rare and eminent Vertue which ſhines in a Prince, raiſes greater motions of Love in the lower ſort of people, then in other men?

IT is a thing worthy to be obſerved, that the vertue of a Prince when it is eminent and rare, ſeems to raiſe more Love in the loweſt ſort of people, then in any others. For we ſee it is commonly the vulgar people that appear moſt afflicted for the death of a good and vertuous Prince, even to weep in the ſtreets, ſhops, and about the fields, with an extream tenderneſs, as it were for a domeſtique loſs, and it is alſo the meaner ſort of people that in his lifetime gives him with more zeal a thouſand benedictions, and labours for his glory with a more paſſionate will,

will, and such as shows that they have more of resentment against those that would do him any wrong. History may furnish us with a thousand strange and admirable examples of this affection of the vulgar people toward a good Prince; but, that I may not enlarge this discourse too much, we will content our selves to name only some of them. We see in *Sueton*, that after the death of *Germanicus*, a Prince of an eminent vertue, the Commonalty of *Rome* grew almost mad, that neither the Edicts of *Tiberius*, nor the Religion of certain *Festivals*, could stop the immoderate course of its grief, and that many of those which were possessed of this grief, went so far as to demolish the Altars of the gods through despair, to cast the tutelar gods of their houses into the streets, and to expose those children that were born to them on that day, as refusing all Happiness and all occasions of Joy. The good qualities of

Julius Cæsar produced also the like effects after his death; for though he had taken from the *Romans* that liberty which they prized so high; nevertheless after that *Antonie* had awakened by his Oration the memory of his Goodness, Clemency, Valour, and of the number of his Victories, the common people that heard him, were so touched with it, that after they had done honours to him as a god, they ran with lighted fire-brands in their hands to set fire to the *Capitol*, and had almost burnt down the City, to be revenged on those that had newly freed it, and reduced the Common-wealth to its antient form. This very *Cæsar* in his life-time was so beloved of his Souldiers, that having failed of their duty, they desired him to decimate them, thereby to expiate their crime, and to give himself satisfaction. The like happened also afterwards to his successor *Augustus*, according to the report of *Appian*. And *Alexander*

the Great, leading his *Macedonian* Souldiers, young and old, croſs the deſerts, for none other deſign but to come to the bounds of the habitable world, was nevertheleſs ſo tenderly beloved of them, for his Vertue, that ſeeing them mutiny to return into *Macedonia*, and even the puniſhment of ſome of them could not ſtop their commotion, he only ſent them word, they might go whether they pleaſed, and that he would love them no longer, nor account them his, which touched them with ſo ſharp a Repentance, that flocking before his door, they fell a crying with abundance of tears, that he ſhould kill them if they had offended him, as *Quintus Curtius* tells the ſtory. But to begin our ſearch for the Reaſon, why the Vertue of a Prince excites in the minds of the common people (that are moſt commonly intereſſed and mercenary) ſuch diſintereſſed and ſuch heroick motions, which ſeem to be

greater then thoſe that are raiſed in the reſt of men that are better bred: is it not, in the firſt place, that the common people are not in all regards inferiour in Vertue to the reſt of men; and that if they be ſomething leſs generous and more mercenary, as we have confeſſed, they are on the other ſide full of Pitty, and have in very many things more of Shame and Juſtice? And may we not add, that as the love which *beaſts* bear to their *young ones*, ſurpaſſes that which *men* bear to their *children*, it may very well be after the ſame manner that amongſt men a good motion may ſometimes be more ſtrong where there is leſs of Reaſon and Knowledge, becauſe then a man obeyes more blindly the good incitements of Nature? Or elſe is it that many times men of a middle rank look upon the Fortune of their Superiours, if not with envy properly ſo called, yet at leſt with ſome evil of heart; and that thoſe of the

loweſt ſort are more free from all theſe motions, becauſe the diſtance between them and thoſe that govern them is greater, and therefore they are diſpoſed the more to conſider their Vertue with Love and Admiration? Or elſe, is it that the motions of an heroick and extraordinary Generoſity, when they ſhine upon the eyes of all in the perſon of a Prince, may excite more of admiration in the minds of the loweſt ſort of people, becauſe they perceive themſelves leſs capable of ever ariſing ſo high? Or elſe is it that when a Prince manifeſts his affection in general to all his ſubjects, the loweſt people think themſelves *moſt obliged* to his goodneſs, becauſe they think themſelves *leaſt worthy* of it? Or elſe, is it not that the greateſt part of the goodneſs of a Prince conſiſts herein, to be favourable to the Poor, which, as being weakeſt, are moſt apt to be wronged by the ſtronger; not to enrich thoſe that are already

too rich, with the ſubſtance of the common people, and to do Juſtice equally to all his ſubjects, without having regard to the difference of quality, and that it is no wonder if all this doth more pleaſe the *common* ſort of people, then perſons of *quality*? Or elſe is it alſo that the vulgar ſort as being leſs inlightned, and leſs polliſhed by Learning, are more dazled by greatneſs of Birth, and have more veneration from the pomp and glory that attends the fortune of Princes: ſo that when the luſtre of Vertue comes to ſhine on their eyes, together with this glittering Greatneſs, it ſeems ſo venerable to them, that it hath power over their minds to do any thing? This laſt truly ſeems to contribute not a little to their Admiration; but, to conclude, we may ſee here by the way, that *Machiavel* had no reaſon to ſay that the Vertue of a Prince can raiſe Love and Gratitude in a few perſons only, and that all the reſt

reſt of men are ingrateful, and incapeable of being moved by it; and therefore in his opinion, he ſhould endeavour rather to make himſelf feared by the rigour of his puniſhments: This appears, ſay I, to be falſe by our Problem, for we have ſeen that the love of a Princes Vertue ſhines chiefly in the common people, which makes the greateſt part of men, and is able to beget in them moſt exquiſite and admirable motions of affections, becauſe of this mixture with Greatneſs, which hath a certain Luſter and Beauty, that doth extreamly take with the people. And if I may be permitted to add ſomething upon this conſideration, I ſhall ſay further, that it is only the baſeneſs of his own mind, that made him imagine that Gratitude, ſhame of an unworthineſs generally confeſt, or love of a rare merit, ſhould have ſo little power upon our ſpirits; for it hath been often ſeen, that a troop of mutiners

from amongſt the very dregs of the people, after they have contemned the fear of puniſhment, have become calm and appeaſed on a ſudden, meerly by the preſence of a man of known vertue, out of reverence which it imprinted in them. There are many crimes which men ceaſe not to commit every day, although they that commit them are every day hanged for it; but on the contrary, there are ingratitudes and unworthineſſes which are committed but very rarely, although the Laws have not ordained any puniſhment for thoſe that are guilty of them, becauſe the greateſt part of men have conceptions lively enough of the blackneſs and ſordidneſs of them. The fear of Death and Pain, which, according to *Machiavel*, do never forſake men, is overcome every day in the wars by the hope of a little pay, and the contempt of them is grown common. But of ſo many thouſand men that hazzard themſelves

ſelves thus, without doubt there would be but a very few, that for a much greater ſumm would betray a friend, by whom they had been ſenſibly obliged. But we leave this diſcourſe, before it hath carried us very much beyond our ſubject, and paſs on to another Problem.

PROB. 43.

What is the reaſon that Shame makes a redneſs to ariſe in the face?

AS there are not any motions more pleaſant and more worthy to be known, then thoſe of *Shame*, ſo there are none that ſeem to produce their effects in us after ſo obſcure a manner, and ſo difficult to explain. The reaſon is, that whatever our mind doth moſt genuinely and after a more natural manner, is alwayes that which it is leaſt aware of. Now the impreſſions that Shame

causes in our blood, and upon our faces, is so natural, that Stage-players which laugh and cry, though they are neither sad nor merry, which can make themselves look pale as if they were afraid, and can artificially draw upon their faces the redness of Anger, and easily counterfeit Pitty, Astonishment, or Disdain, cannot for all this by any cunning draw upon their faces the redness of Shame, and the characters which it ought to be accompanied with. Besides, he that cryes hath an intention to cry, and he that weeps hath an intention to weep: but most commonly he that blushes hath no intention to blush; and this is the reason that very modest persons blush even at their very blushing, and by endeavouring to hide their Shame, increase and double it. Lastly, that which makes the difficulty of this Problem appear greater, is, that it is certain the redness of Shame proceeds alwayes from some grief

and

and pain which the ſoul is in. Now it is the property of Grief to repreſs the blood and ſpirits, and gather them together about the heart, inſtead of ſpreading of them in the face, as ſhame doth. Nevertheleſs, we will endeavour here to diſcover the myſterie of ſo handſom a paſſion: And firſt we will tell you what ſome have thought, that the ſoul ſends forth the blood into the face in ſhame, becauſe it deſires to cover it as with a veil; whereto they endeavour to add ſome weight from experience, which ſhows us, that thoſe which are ſurprized with Shame, do naturally hold their hand before their face. Now as I do not abſolutely reject this conſideration of theirs, yet I do not think it ought to ſatisfie us ſo, but that we ſhould ſearch for others: For beſides that it is perhaps a pretty *fancy* rather than a *reaſon*, certain it is, that many times they that are ſurprized with Shame, do not deſire to hide their faces

faces from him that cenſures them, but on the contrary do earneſtly wiſh that he read therein his repentance and ſorrow, and for all this ceaſe not to bluſh. To ſearch then another cauſe of this effect, we muſt in the firſt place conſider, that in all the Paſſions, the *Soul* imprints the images of its leaſt motions upon the *body*, and there figures out what it reſents, and what it ſuffers by certain diſpoſitions which it gives it, as it were by ſo many *Emblems* and *Metaphorical pictures*, whether it doth it out of deſign, or be conſtrained to it by neceſſity. Thus, for example, angry people hold up their heads high, and commonly ſet both their hands on their ſides, becauſe holding the head high and taking up more room then before, is a *Metaphorical* expreſſion of the vain elevation of a preſumptuous mind, and of the greatneſs which it falſly attributes to it ſelf: So a man that affirms any thing with much zeal and opinionativeneſſe,

onativeneſſe, commonly bends his fiſts, becauſe this action hath ſome Analogy and correſpondence with the eſtate in which the ſoul is. But it were unprofitable and endleſs to think to prove a thing ſo clear and certain, by enumerating all our paſſions; wherefore ſuppoſing it rather true, we ſay (and I think with much colour of Reaſon) that in all griefs and ſadneſſes, when the ſoul flyes ſome external evil, and conſiders it as external, it makes the ſpirits of the outward parts fly towards the inward, becauſe ſuch a motion as ſhews that it deſires from all ſides to enter into its ſelf, thereby to eſcape that evil which comes unto it from without, is moſt proper to repreſent to the life the deſire which it then hath, and the condition it is in: but on the contrary in the grief of Shame, becauſe it is touched with the horrour and hatred of an evil, that is within it ſelf, and is faſtened to its own ſubſtance, ſince it is nothing

elſe

elſe but its own imperfection, it cannot better expreſs this horrour and hatred, then by violently thruſting forth the blood and ſpirits from within to the outward parts, as if it would baniſh them from us, ſince that indeed it is an eſtate that hath ſome Analogy with this corporal motion, and that it would if it could, baniſh it ſelf, and go out of its ſelf, by that means to fly from the vice which it finds it is defiled with. Moreover *Shame* dilates the ſpirits and the blood, and ſheds them upon the face more ſubtilly then any other paſſion, becauſe it proceeds from a moſt ſpiritual conception, to wit, from the conception of a diſhoneſt thing, and that the more ſpiritual impreſſions have alſo more quick and ſuddain effects. To this effuſion of the blood and ſpirits, contributes alſo perhaps after another ſort, the contempt which in ſhame the ſoul hath of its ſelf; for ſeeing that then when it is moſt careful to preſerve

and

and defend us (as for example in Fear and in Affliction) it doth extraordinarily contract and keep them within, to strengthen it self the more; it may be, on the contrary, when it hates, and thinks it self as it were unworthy of its own care, it doth by a natural motion remit much of that straining, which holds the spirits thus united and collected, and gives them more liberty to spread themselves, and to carry the blood along with them. But if this contribute nothing at all to it, the first reason that we give, is methinks sufficient to clear this *Problem*; for though for the most part we do not blush, if we do not think our selves really in fault: yet sometimes a calumny makes us blush; and some may wonder that it should be so, since then the soul, one would think, cannot be troubled with any remorse, nor with any sense of its own imperfection. To this I answer, that in truth we cannot have a true remorse

of

of faults, which we have not committed; but as he which hath for ſome time held his eyes fixt upon a deep precipice, into which it is impoſſible he ſhould fall, yet cannot chooſe but tremble out of a vain ſhadow of fear that this image gives him: So he that hath great horrour for ſome fault which he is falſly accuſed of, according as he hath his mind bent upon the conſideration of the lewdneſs which is attributed to him, cannot chooſe, notwithſtanding the clear teſtimony of his own Conſcience and of Reaſon, but be ſurprized many times with a vain ſhadow of remorſe, which makes a bluſh mount into his face, ere his ſoul hath had time to think better on it.

PROB.

PROB. 44.

What is the reaſon that when we bluſh, it appears eſpecially in the fore-head?

IS it not becauſe the fore-head is the *whiteſt* part of the face, and moſt free from natural redneſs, and conſequently moſt apt to make that more lively appear, which ſhame imprints in it? Or elſe the blood which ſhame brings into the face, doth it not appear chiefly in the fore-head, becauſe the skin thereof is extreamly *thin* and *delicate*, as one may eaſily perceive by ſo many little wrinkles, which Horrour, Diſcontent, Admiration or Anger do make in it, and becauſe it is free from *hair*, which in the other parts of the face may in ſome ſort hinder us for perceiving ſo well the impreſſions which come into it from within? Or elſe, if

if the conceit of thoſe that ſay, that in ſhame the ſoul ſends the blood into the face to cover it therewith, as with a veil, muſt take place; may we not ſay, that it ſends it eſpecially into the fore-head, becauſe it is the part moſt *expoſed* to the *view* of of him that cenſures us: ſeeing that when we ſpeak to men, we are wont to look them in the fore-head: Or elſe do not the ſpirits in ſpreading themſelves, make the blood eſpecially come under the skin of the fore-head, for that it is the *higheſt* part of the face, and that it is their nature to *aſcend* as much as they can, as ſoon as the ſoul lets go her hold by which ſhe keeps them in the body?

PROB.

Prob. 45.

What is the reason that praises make a man blush?

IS it not because he that is much commended, feels many times that the excess of praises which are given to him, do puff him up whether he will or no with a little pride, and tickle him with a pleasure that dissolves and as it were shakes all his gravity and firmness: So that he blushes not at the praises, but at the weakness he finds in himself and discovers to others? Truly that which shews that it may be thus, is, that we see those which are most subject to blush when they hear themselves praised, are commonly such persons as have indeed a sincere goodness, but have not a soul really great; for a great soul is not puft up nor elevated at the praises it receives, any more

more than the Sea is encreaſed or heightened by the water of Rivers that run into it. But it may be too all their redneſs proceeds not from *Shame*, but comes partly from an extream *pleaſure* they take to hear themſelves praiſed; for pleaſure alſo diffuſes the ſpirits and gives ſome colour to the face. Or elſe that on the one ſide, an honeſt and good ſoul hath not alwayes the courage, generouſly to reject the falſe praiſes that are given it, becauſe it loves glory; but that, on the other ſide, becauſe of its goodneſs, it bluſheth at the fault it commits in not reſiſting them, and in taking to it ſelf by this complacence an honour which is not its due. Or elſe, is it not out of extream *Humility* that a man bluſhes, in hearing himſelf praiſed for that he doth not at all believe that he is maſter of thoſe perfections which are attributed to him, and that the praiſes given him, ſhow him what he ought to be, and therefore

fore do only quicken the ſenſe which he hath of his imperfections? Or elſe, is it becauſe he that highly commends us, makes every one look on us the more, and doth in a manner draw us out of obſcurity by this glory which he procures us, and that then we bluſh not at our glory, but rather becauſe we apprehend that our faults will appear the more in this great light which it ſets us in, and that it doth as well illuſtrate our blemiſhes as our perfections, and renders them the more remarkable? Here poſſibly ſome may ſay to me, if the bluſhing of ſhame proceeds only from the ſenſe which we have of our imperfection, as you have eſtabliſhed it in another *Problem*, to what purpoſe is it that our faults are objected to us by others to make us bluſh, and what is the reaſon that it contributes thereto? I anſwer, that it is becauſe the judgement of others doth alwayes confirm ours, and therefore if we think that another

blames and condemns a fault which we have committed, this belief of his doth more ſtrengthen the opinion which we had of it before, and doth more lively manifeſt the uglineſs of it.

Prob. 46.

What is the reaſon that a man laughs more at a pleaſant jeſt, or a merry tale, when he himſelf that tells it, doth not laugh?

IS it not becauſe then he doth not ſeem to have the deſign which he hath, I mean, that he ſeems as if he would tell ſomething ſerious and of importance, whereas he only tells ſome trifle, and that our mind takes pleaſure in this deceit? But why doth it take more delight in this *deceit*, then it would have done in ſeeing the naked *truth*? Is it not becauſe in diſcovering it thus through a

lye, that is transparent and easily penetrable, it still somewhat exerciseth its noblest faculty, the judgement, and gives to it self some proof of its sufficiency and light? Or else is it because a ridiculous thing spoken in a cold and serious tone, *surprizeth* us the more, because we did not expect to see it in this form, and under this appearance, and so it is proper to cause *laughter*, which must arise from a being *surprized*, whereas he that laughs whilest he tells a merry story, doth as it were *threaten* us and give us *warning* before hand, so that he doth not *surprize* us at all? But why must laughter arise from a *surprize*? Is it, as some say, because it proceeds from *Admiration*, which is raised chiefly by a *novelty*? Or else, is it because that which makes us laugh, is alwayes so vain, that if our minds could consider it a little at leisure, it would not find in it any subject of contentment? Or else, do we not laugh, when he that

tells

tells us any merry thing laughs much at it, becauſe he ſeems to us as if he commended himſelf; and that otherwiſe that which he ſayes, ſeems to be leſs pleaſant, and leſs apt to cauſe laughter, when we ſee he helps it forward by beginning to laugh firſt? Or elſe laſtly, is it becauſe he which tells a merry paſſage without laughing, appears to have ſome politeneſs, and with all gravity of manners: So that as he appears a more honeſt man, ſo likewiſe whatever he ſaith, hath more of grace in his mouth, and delights us the more, whereas if he laughs too much, he appears only a *Bouffon*, and by this means whatever he ſaies, though never ſo good, loſes more then half its grace and beauty?

PROB. 47.

Why do we laugh in seeing a thing very ill-favoured, since that which delights the mind, one would think ought to have in it some perfection?

TO escape this difficulty which is not so slight, but that many ancient Philosophers, and Oratours have laboured to little purpose for the clearing of it: may we not say in the first place, that a man doth not laugh at ugly things, when they are wholly and altogether such, since that on the contrary we do then call them horrible, and fly from them as things odious; but that most commonly a man laughs at some trifling and slight grace mixt with their deformity? as for example, it is clear that the habit of a *Bouffon* though it be deformed, hath

many times I know not what grace that may tickle the imagination; But what is the reaſon this remnant of grace, and this vain and ſlight ray of goodneſs that may be found in ſome ill-favoured things, makes one laugh more then a thing reaſonably well made would do? May it not poſſibly be becauſe in a thing ill made, the defects that it hath, may by their oppoſition render in ſome ſort more pleaſant, and more grateſull to the fancy, that little grace which ſhines in it? Or elſe rather, is it not becauſe generally every grace or prettineſs that makes one laugh, either in handſome or unhandſome things, ſhould be alwayes vain and ſlight, and not ſolid, as we ſaid in the foregoing *Problem*? But why ſhould it be ſo? Is it not becauſe ſolid graces chiefly affecting the *Judgement*, and approving themſelves to us by our diſcretion and underſtanding, do produce a pleaſure though *greater*, yet more *ſober*

and

and such as hath something of *grace* in it; but a vain and slight grace, affecting especially the *imagination*, and being chiefly liked by our weakness, fills us also with a joy that manifests somewhat of weakness and childishness, and takes from us all gravity, and makes us not able to hold our countenance, which is that we call laughter, and therefore they say it is a sign of folly in those that are much subject to it? Or else do not things that are very ill-favoured delight those that look upon them because they are *rare* as well as things perfect and excellent? Or else is it not that as our soul loves to have its *Ideas* perfect and intirely expressive of their objects, for this reason it is pleased more in considering things very ill done, then moderately well, because these first do perfect and accomplish the *Idea* which it hath of uglineſs, and fills up its knowledge to the full every way; whereas those that are moderately

well done can give it only imperfect notions? Or elſe do not objects that are very ill done, by giving us an *Idea* of extream imperfection, furniſh us with an eaſie way to draw from thence the image of extream perfection, and to render it more lively in us; ſo that they very much inſtructing our mind, it delights it ſelf to conſider them, not for any reaſon that perſwades it that it ſhould do ſo, but by a natural and blind motion that makes it ſearch in it to perfect its knowledge, and to inſtruct its ſelf? Or elſe, do we not love to ſee things very ill done, to ſhew our abilities in condemning them? But what is the reaſon we cannot as well ſhow them in praiſing thoſe that are moderately well done? Is it not becauſe every body knows at firſt ſight that which is extream, and findes more difficulty in that which is moderate? Or becauſe, as we ſaid in another *Problem*, it is eaſier to blame then to commend?

Or

Or elſe, do we not delight to expreſs the rules of good, whereof we have all ſome *Theory*, rather on the ſubject of an ill made thing, then of one that is well made, becauſe a thing well made contains them in its ſelf, and ſo ſeems to ſuggeſt them to us, and to leave nothing to our invention, whereas when we expreſs them by blaming a deformed thing, we ſeem to invent them our ſelves? It is probable indeed that fools do it for this reaſon, becauſe they think they cannot manifeſt their wit better then by detracting and finding faule. Or elſe, to conclude, is it not in many meerly an odd fantaſtical and childiſh humour to like a thing that is deformed, and to conſider it with ſatisfaction, and therefore we ſee that all fools laugh more heartily at monſtrous and extravagant things, and that good and diſcreet men ſmiling only at theſe, do laugh more heartily at things excellent and handſome, as at a bold

and neat reply, at a pretty compendious way by which ſome one hath brought about his deſires, or at ſome gentleneſs that ſhines in his actions, at a graceſull motion of the body, at the fit proportions and correſpondence of all the parts of an Hiſtory, or Fable, at a paſſion naturally expreſt, or ſome ſuch like thing?

Prob. 48.

What is the reaſon that Man being inclined to flatter himſelf, doth nevertheleſs aggravate his own imperfection above the truth; as for example, in ſaying there is nothing but folly, and injuſtice, and ingratitude in the world?

Firſt, it may be ſaid on this ſubject, that in truth man attains moſt commonly to a mediocrity of *wiſdome*, ſeeing there are ſcarce any that

that have not the uſe of common ſence; and that to ſpeak civilly, he alſo attains ordinarily to a moderate and common *Virtue*, ſeeing there are few that become unnatural: but that for all this, when we come to compare this wiſdome, and this ordinary virtue of men with a ſtate of *Perfection* much greater, which reaſon gives us the *Idea* of, we finde our ſelves forced to name them *Vice* and *Folly*, juſt as we call foul linnen black, in comparing it with that which hath been new waſhed, or with ſnow, though it be white in it ſelf and in compariſon with Ink; for every mean ſtate is an evil in regard of an excellency which is much above it as truly as it is a good, in regard of that which is beneath it. Now our ſoul is ſo much the more apt to look upon the good that is in it with diſdain, becauſe it finds it is born for a ſtate of perfection much more eminent; and thus though an *Artiſan* be to be com-

mended if he perfectly underſtand any mechanick art; yet wheen we judge of a *Prince*, we make no account of ſuch an ability, if he hath no other, becauſe we conceive he is born for much greater things. Secondly, our ſoul doth often attribute to it ſelf more imperfection then it hath, becauſe the good already gotten ſlips out of our memory, and doth not ordinarily preſent it ſelf to our minds, as that which is wanting doth; the reaſon of it is, becauſe the ſoul alwayes withdraws its ſight from the things about which it hath no more to do, as on the contrary, it fixeth it upon thoſe that give it ſome occaſion of deſire and endeavour. In the third place, a man doth not think there is any need of aggravating the *good* that is in man, and believes rather it would be a thing very hurtful: but on the contrary, he thinks it is very profitable to aggravate his *Vice* and *Folly*, which is alſo very true, but yet to ſome

ſome certain degrees only; for to give to man too low conceptions of himſelf, and ſuch as are like him, is an abating of his Courage and quenching of his Emulation. But however hereby, ſometimes the imperfection of man ſeems to us to be greater then it is; for to conſider, firſt, that which regards his *underſtanding*, oftentimes when we ſpeak of many fools, we ſay with a ſerious tone, as if we deſired to be believed, and to have it paſs for an *Axiome*, that they have no more judgement then beaſts; nay in aggravating their folly, we think ſometimes that beaſts have more: though if we conſider it aright and according to the truth of the buſineſs, a man that is the moſt void of wit, gives, at but opening his eyes, and by his firſt geſtures, and by his firſt looks, tokens of a greater judgement then all beaſts put together: There are alſo Philoſophers that have contributed to the making of the generality of men be

ſo ſeverely condemned; for whether it were, that herein, they alwayes had for their end ſome profit that might be reaped by it, or that at ſometimes they might be put upon it for ſome other reaſons, they have one after another aggravated his folly in ſuch a manner as if they had a minde to take from him even common ſenſe. In this there is too much ſeverity and bitterneſs; for we ſhould not conſider only the *faults* of people, but alſo the *good* that is in them, and then we ſhall finde that in many things they have the firſt notions moſt quick and moſt pure, though they know not how to diſcourſe of them exactly, and after a ſubtile manner: we ſhould not alſo impute as ſo many *faults* of their *underſtanding*, all the *weakneſſes* of their *imagination*, and take them in the worſt ſenſe that can be; for all things appear bad to him that conſiders them not with *candor* and *equity*; and he that is reſolved never

ver to see any thing but bad, makes short work, by casting himself into an excess of rigour, and turning away his eyes from that which is laudable in them; but by this means he depraves himself, and not that which he considers after this manner; the same also happens from the aggravating of mens vice. But to discover yet another cause that makes us thus defame our nature many times beyond the truth, it may further be said, that every one thinks to gain something to his own advantage in vilifying mankind, and the generality of men; for if he hath any perfection, he is more willing to perswade himself, that it comes to him from what he hath *particular* and proper, then to believe that it proceeds from what he hath in *common* with others; the reason whereof is, because what he hath in particular, is more his own; and on the contrary if he hath any imperfection, he also findes some comfort

in

in the diſpleaſure it doth him, by attributing it to the general nature of man, rather then to the fault of his own individual nature: But eſpecially wicked men are put upon a like deſign by the like motive; for, that they may finde out ſome excuſe, they endeavour to include all others in the ſame fault, which they themſelves are guilty of: they ſcrape together therefore what ever is moſt ugly in our life, and make it much worſe in expreſſing it, and in giving ill interpretations of it; and when we hear them thus aggravate much beyond the truth that which is ill in us, we contradict them not, as well becauſe as I told you, that we think it is *profitable* it ſhould be ſo, as alſo becauſe it ſeems to be *Humility* to conſent to an accuſation in which we are comprized; and on the contrary that it is *arrogance* and *preſumption* to oppoſe it. From hence then ariſe many ſayings and expreſſions, which import that reaſon

ſon can do nothing or very little on the mind of man, that there is nothing but injuſtice and ingratitude to be ſeen in the world, and ſuch other like things, which are contrary to other ſayings that we have at other times, which are as much beyond the truth: for it is not more impoſſible that heaven ſhould fall, then it is impoſſible that Juſtice and Reaſon ſhould ceaſe to have very much power upon the minds of men, and that they ſhould not ſuffer themſelves to be bent and affected with this ſame Reaſon, as their particular intereſt. Pirats, robbers upon the high-way, poyſoners, and the moſt deteſtable of men, do not make any exception againſt this rule; and though Choler be the moſt wild and ſavage of all our paſſions, and though it ſtir whatſoever is moſt baſe and evil in us; yet that which firſt kindles it is an indignity, which is nothing elſe but injuſtice: and therefore Poets that

are

are the Painters of the ordinary motions of the ſoul, when they bring upon the ſtage one that talking to himſelf alone labours to animate himſelf with a violent rage, they make him inſiſt longer upon reaſons drawn from juſtice or injuſtice, then upon others drawn from profit; and not without cauſe, for if a man do only conclude in himſelf, that it is profitable for him to be angry, there would be nothing more cold then ſuch an inticement, and he would not for this obtain of himſelf to be angry in good earneſt; but if he be perſwaded that it is juſt he ſhould be ſo, this conſideration would without fail put fire into his ſoul as ſoon as ever he thi[illegible]f it, and will there kindle the flames of choler: Hence it comes that a thief, what want ſo ever he have of money, will not be angry that a man hath been ſo careful as not to let him cut his purſe; for he cannot ſee in this any indignity, and he doth abſolutely want

the

the considerations of justice, which ought to begin the forming of choler in him. And as for the common sayings by which we express the want of gratitude, which we ordinarily see in men, they also do often surpass the truth; for if we consider it well, there is nothing more pressing than a motion of gratitude, and experience shews sufficient examples of it amongst all sorts of men. But to leave this discourse, I will add, that because there are few spirits so miserable, as to endeavour to make themselves more wicked then they are: Man, for that reason, knows not how inaccessible the extremity of vice is, and how impossible it would be for him to dispoile himself of what ever there is good and laudable in his nature, and to go quite contrary to the rules of Reason; and that this makes him sometimes have too ill an opinion of himself, and to pass beyond the bounds of truth in blaming himself.

PROB.

PROB. 49.

What is the reaſon that according to the common ſaying of the Poets and of Ariſtotle himſelf in the ſecond book of his Politicks, Valiant and couragious perſons are moſt ſubject to love?

IS it not becauſe courage and an inclination to Love have one and the ſame Original in the Temperament, namely heat of blood, which may be perceived in that the age wherein man is moſt couragious through the heat of his blood, is that wherein he is moſt inclined to Love? Or elſe, is it not becauſe Love is a paſſion which hath ſome beauty and nobleneſs, and that men truly couragious, as they have a more noble ſoul, ſo have they alſo a greater propenſion to all the Paſſions that have any ray of nobleneſs and beauty, and

and proceed partly from a good principle? Indeed we see, that for this reason they are subject to ambition, because ambition hath some mixture of generosity, and of the Love of that which is honest; and to Opinionativeness, because it hath a shadow of constancy; but that on the contrary they are farther then other men from Avarice, Cruelty, and desire of Revenge, because these motions of the soul have not the least footsteps of any nobleness and beauty. Now to shew that Love is a passion which hath some nobleness and something of praise-worthy, we may bring this reason, that (whatsoever some say that would decide this business by fine expressions, and have their jests pass for Oracles) a true Lover doth in some sort love beauty for it self, and not only for the hope of a base and brutish pleasure; for he not only humbles himself before the beloved object, as we humble our selves before a great man by constraint

ſtraint, and with repugnance, and to obtain ſome good of him, but he alſo takes pleaſure in this very act of ſubmiſſion, and the more he humbles himſelf with innocence and freeneſs, and without any deſign, the more this pleaſure increaſes in him, which is an infallible token that he makes this the end of part of his deſire: Juſtly therefore do the Poets call the exceſs of Love *handſome fooleries*; for though they be *fooleries* in that they chooſe their objects ill, they have ſome *Beauty* in that they denote in the ſoul where they are formed, ſome violent inclination to love *perfection*. Or elſe may we ſay, that even the inclination to love perfection is the ſole motive and only fountain of true courage, ſo that if Love have in it any ray or ſpark thereof, it is no wonder that thoſe who have an extream high courage, are the more ſubject to it? Or elſe is it that it is an hard matter to reſiſt at once two contrary aſſaults, becauſe this ſeems

to

to require two contrary diſpoſitions of mind; and that for this reaſon they that have a ſoul ſtrong to reſiſt griefs and objects of terrour, are many times extraordinary weak againſt pleaſures and objects that conquer by flattering our ſenſes, amongſt which thoſe that cauſe Love are the moſt alluring? Certainly, it ſeems credible, when we conſider the great weakneſs with which men, the moſt famous for their courage, have yeilded to pleaſures of this kind. Nevertheleſs, herein their courage was imperfect; for our ſoul ought not to be firme like *Ice* very hard frozen, which reſiſting the blows of hatchets, and bearing heavy burdens, yet makes leſs reſiſtance to a ſmall heat, and to a ray of the Sun, then the moſt weak things; but rather like to a *Diamant* which equally reſiſts all aſſaults: and as a ſword cuts alike on both ſides, ſo a perfect and compleat courage ſhould be whetted on both ſides, and have as it were two

edges

edges and two points to reſiſt equally *Pleaſures* and *Pains*; Or elſe, theſe two different parts of courage, which we now ſpeak of, have not at all any thing of contrary, and do ſpring rather from the ſame fountain: but as though the Viſual faculty hath one and the ſame ſpring, yet when we would collect it into one of the eyes, and there make it become more ſtrong, we do naturally ſhut the other: ſo our ſoul in uniting all its force towards ſome one ſide, remits in it other regards, and in avoiding with great care ſome kind of weakneſs, it falls more readily into others.

Prob. 50.

Whence comes that averſion to marriage of perſons too near?

AS there is no queſtion but the condemning of Marriage between

tween persons too near, is less clear by reason, then the condemning of vices, which are formally the motions of malice: so he that would infer from thence, that there is nothing of *nature* in this, and that it is wholly a *Civil* constitution, and no more, will be deceived; since that the general inclination and opinion of men testifies the contrary; for a general opinion can never fail of being true, at least in part; and the example of beasts cannot upon this subject be considerable to a man of judgement; for it were absurd to think that beasts should respect an affinity which they know not; and he that should say that laughter, shame, desire of glory, desire of knowledge and the like, are not natural to *Man*, because they are not natural to *beasts*, would evidently make a ridiculous consequence. And if men cannot give particular reasons why they disapprove this sort of marriages, and specifie what they

finde

finde inconvenient therein according to reaſon, we ought to think that for all that they ſee it in *groſs* and at a *diſtance*, as many times we ſee afar off an *houſe*, though we be not able to diſtinguiſh the *dores*, *windows*, and other parts of it. And by how much the leſs clear the reaſons of it are, ſo much the more reaſon have we to exerciſe our ſelves in the diſcovery of them in this *Problem*. *Firſt* then I ſhall ſay, that not only nature gives us a ſtrong inclination to love thoſe perſons which are very near us, and are members of the ſame family with us, (for of this no man that hath his ſenſes can doubt) but that it alſo makes us conſider them in ſome manner as we do our ſelves: This appears in that if a man commends one that is very near us, we bluſh at it as if he commended us, and do out of humility deſire him to forbear, as if theſe praiſes were meant to us. This being ſo, as every one is naturally far from the folly into which

Narciſſus fell, and is not capable of being touched with the love of his own beauty: by the ſame reaſon he naturally flyes from regarding with Paſſions like to thoſe of Lovers, the perſons for whom he hath an affection of the ſame nature and kind with that which he hath for himſelf; and this is a token of the ardour and truth of the Amity which he bears them; as on the contrary, if this Amity ſhould ceaſe to have the qualities and properties of that which he bears to himſelf, it were a certain ſign that it had received diminution, and is not ſuch as nature requires it ſhould be. In the *ſecond* place, the reverence which Proximity gives to perſons that are of the ſame family, being an obligation ſo ſtraight and ſo natural, that the ancient *Romans* have named it *Piety*, and that every honeſt ſoul conſiders it as a *ſacred* thing; it proceeds from hence that a man deſires to ſee the degrees of it very diſtinct, and ſeparate, in ſeveral perſons,

perſons, to the end that it may the more exactly diſcharge the duties that belong unto it, and diſcern more clearly after what manner he ought to be affected towards each of them in particular; for he perceives that this knowledge would become much more obſcure by marriages that ſhould unite in one and the ſame perſon *two* of theſe degrees firſt, and afterwards *three* or *four* or more of them; and that in this caſe there would be requiſite much ſubtilty of wit to diſcern the obligation that ſhould ariſe from the mixture of theſe different or contrary obligations. If beſides theſe general reaſons we ſhall need to alledge others, touching the different degrees of Proximity, firſt, to ſhew that reaſon prohibits marriage with thoſe men or women that are of our neareſt kindred to whom we owe reſpect, I ſhall alledge thoſe well-known verſes, whoſe truth every one will confeſs,

Non

Non bene conveniunt nec in unâ ſede morantur
Majeſtas & Amor. That is,

A real Love and Majeſty,
Can hardly in one boſom lie.

Whereupon I add, that if Reaſon forbids us to uſe too familiar *careſſes* towards thoſe perſons I ſpake of, it doth likewiſe forbid us to deſire to unite our ſelves to them in ſuch a manner of union as above all others produces Familiarity, and doth neceſſarily deface and aboliſh Reſpect and Inequality: I mean that Union wherein marriage conſiſts. It remains then only to ſpeak of that marriage which may be imagined between *Brother* and *Siſter*, in regard of which the preceding reaſon can have no place, ſeeing they owe one another no *Reſpect*, but meerly *Amity*. It is well known what a great Perſonage diſcourſing on this ſub-

ject, hath ſaid, to wit, that the affection which would ariſe from ſuch a marriage, as being produced from the concourſe of two ſuch potent conſiderations, would be ſomewhat too ardent. But, for my part, I do not think he ſhould have taken it thus, nay I conceive, that in ſome ſort it ought to have been taken quite contrary. But before I explain my ſelf more clearly, I will ſay that in every *ſpecies* of the Paſſions, there are of them that are contrary to one another, and that expell one another, and are incompatible, inſtead of increaſing and mutually aſſiſting each other. Thus, for example, there are contrary *Joyes*; for there is a certain *Brutiſh Joy*, which is ſo incompatible with another *Spiritual Joy*, that when this laſt poſſeſſes the ſoul, the other muſt neceſſarily give place; and hence it comes to paſs that many that feel within themſelves moſt perfect pleaſures, and ſuch as are very ſpiritual, have in their conn-

countenance an ayr of ſadneſs, very far from having their eyes cheerful, and thoſe other marks that accompany lower and baſer pleaſures. Thus a *ſadneſs* that raiſes in a man a diſcourſe which he intends to make upon Humane vanities and miſery, being very far from encreaſing that which the loſs of a ſuit at Law, or the like, hath begotten in him, diminiſhes it, and inſtead of overcharging his ſpirit, comforts it: Thus *Grief* for a *diſgrace* far from augmenting the weakneſs into which our ſoul is caſt through a corporal grief, ſerves many times to take from her the ſenſe of it. In a word, it were eaſie to ſhew, that there are alſo thus *Angers*, *Fears*, *Loves*, Enemies, as I may ſo ſay, one to another, and incompatible. This being thus premiſed, I ſay, that the Paſſion which we properly call *Love*, as ariſing from a *bodily* pleaſure, and being altogether *ſportful* and *wanton*, and an enemy to all *ſerious* thoughts

and considerations, according to the saying of Poets and of Lovers themselves, cannot but be of a nature more contrary to *Fraternal Love*, which is altogether *Spiritual*, *Holy*, and *Serious*, and flows only from *Reason*. That for this cause so far are they from encreasing one another, it is certain that That must necessarily loosen all the bonds of This, and that as we perceive that it loosens them, and that we have a very great inclination to keep them still fast and united, and such as nature would have them to be, we feel also for this cause a repugnance, by reason of that which thus loosens them. And herein we do for all the world, as if a man should go about to make us laugh heartily, by making some serious and profound contemplation of Philosophie to encrease the pleasure of it; for we should soon perceive that quite contrary these two sorts of Joy cannot agree together, much less augment one another;

another; and that it were an extravigance to think they ſhould. This is all I have to ſay upon this ſubject.

PROB. 51.

Whence proceed the exceſſive heats of the Moneth of Auguſt, *and the other effects which are attributed to the Dog-ſtar?*

I Have much reaſon to fear that I ſhall be accounted raſh, if I dare to queſtion the power which is generally granted to the *Dog-ſtar*: but on the other ſide alſo, I conceive that if herein I am raſh, I ought to be pardoned, in conſideration that I undertake by this means to maintain familiar and *known* cauſes againſt *occult ones*; For as in *Law*, the cauſe of *Liberty* againſt *Servitude* is alwayes favourable, I conceive likewiſe that in diſputes of *Philoſophie*,

the reaſons which are drawn from *known* and *familiar* things, ought to be favoured againſt all thoſe that conſiſt in *Sympathie*, or in *ſecret influence*, or in *ſpecifick* qualities, and yet no doubt we ought to have recourſe to theſe laſt: but it is only as people that are like to be drowned, catch at thorns, and embrace them in that preſſing need: that is to ſay, when we find no other means to deliver our ſelves from a difficulty: for ſo long as there is any other means of eſcaping it, if it be but any thing tolerable, this muſt needs be very bad. But to come to the preſent buſineſs, Thoſe which have conſidered that the heat of the Moneth of *Auguſt* is greater then that of the Moneths of *June* and *July*, although in them the Sun be nearer to us, and ſtrikes us with leſs oblique rayes, and makes longer dayes, have thence inferred, that this exceſs of heat proceeds from the influence of a Star which is called the *Dog*, to which

they

they have also given other ill qualities: for this (if we will believe what they say of it) is the cause that in *August* the heat of the Sun is more malignant, even when it is no greater then in the other Moneths of Summer; that many creatures, and especially Dogs, do then run mad; and that it is then more dangerous to go into the water; and that sicknesses are more frequent and greater; and that men feel some particular weaknesses in all the parts of the body. But all things well considered, it will be found, that there is nothing in all this that should oblige us to attribute secret and particular vertues to the Dog-star, and to leave the large field of known and ordinary causes; For first I do not see why we should wonder, that the Sun is hotter in *August* then in *July*, though it be true that in *August* he regards us somewhat more obliquely, and that the dayes are shotter; the reason of

It is, because the Earth having been exceedingly dryed by the former heats, is more apt to be violently scorched, as we see that any dry thing set before a lesser fire, receives a more violent heat, then a thing that is moist from a fire that is much greater. That this reason is pertinent, there is an experience that methinks proves it plainly enough; it is, that though at noon the Sun be nearer to us, and cast more direct rayes on us then he doth any time after: yet those that travel in Summer, do perceive a more violent heat two or three hours after-noon, then at noon it self; the reason whereof is, that at noon the moisture of the morning is not so well dryed up, either on the grass, or the air, or the earth, as it is a while after. This example is so put to the subject I apply it to, the Question in hand, that there cannot be found any difference in it, and it may serve well enough to prove what I say; for as somebody hath

hath well obſerved, the images of the *Four Seaſons* of the year, are to be ſeen in one only Day, in which the *Morning* by its moiſture repreſents the *Spring*: *Noon* and ſometime after is like the *Summer Solſtice*, and the two Moneths that follow it; the *Evening* to the *Autum*: and the arrival of *Night* to the arrival of *Winter*. Now as this reaſon renders the heat of *Auguſt* greater, it is manifeſt that withall it renders it neceſſarily more malign. But yet if it be objected that it is often more malignant then that of other Moneths, without being more violent: I anſwer, that this doth not yet force us to fly to a ſecret cauſe; for if it were neceſſary to attribute this particular malignity to the influence of ſome Star, it would follow alſo, that we muſt give influences to ſome other Star, for to render a reaſon of the particular malignity of the Sun in *March*, which as having a very feeble heat, one would think, ſhould

not

not be able to be hurtful, and to engender ſo eaſily rhumes and catarrhs. But, to ſay the truth, theſe two ſeveral malignities are the effects only of the courſe of the year, and of two contrary extreams; for the *Sun* in *March* hath ſomething of malign and dangerous, by reaſon of the great humidity it meets with in the earth, nay and in our brain, on which it acts ſo weakly, that inſtead of diſſolving, it only dilates it. And on the contrary, the Sun in *Auguſt* is extraordinary hurtful through an exceſs of dryneſs which it finds in the earth, after it hath endured the heats of a great part of Summer, and in our bodies, which the ſame heats have dryed. It is this dryneſs which at this time diſpoſes beaſts to madneſs, though indeed Dogs run mad not only in *Auguſt*, but alſo very often in the Moneths of *June* and *July*, or *September*, which need not for this borrow any thing of the *Dog-ſtar*. From this exceſſive dry-

neſſe

neſſe proceeds likewiſe the weakneſs which we feel then in our bodies, and the diſpoſition which this ſeaſon puts us in, to divers maladies; for every extream is alwayes nigh an evil, and eaſily falls into one, or rather is one it ſelf: To conclude, if thoſe that ſwim in this Moneth, do find that the waters are more unwholſom then they were before, a man may ſay, it is becauſe their more *pure* and *ſubtile* parts have been exhaled by the precedent heats, and that what remains is *groſs* and *impure*. And I do not ſee that there is any thing in this, we ſhould need to attribute to the *Dog-ſtar*, more then in the other things we mentioned.

THE END.